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Abstract: This Article attempts to reframe a burgeoning scholarly debate about the
appropriateness of neighborhood self-governance as both a means to local crime control and
a normatively worthy end in itself. On one side of the existing debate stands an emerging and
influential group of "new discretion" scholars, who defend the delegation of discretion to
police officers attempting to enforce social norms that are often ambiguous. These scholars
argue that the support and involvement of so-called "communities" in such law enforcement
efforts can be an adequate substitute for traditional judicial scrutiny of police discretion,
particularly the prohibition against vague criminal laws. On the other side of the debate are
traditional civil libertarians who view norm-based policing and the theories of selfgovernance underlying it as thinly disguised forms of majoritarianism.
This Article has two primary goals. One goal is to use the author's experience as a
community-based prosecutor to critique the new discretion scholars' reliance upon malleable
notions of community to determine the legality of police programs. The second goal is to
develop a more meaningful distinction among new policing efforts. Specifically, this Article
advocates a distinction between civil and criminal initiatives. This approach would retain the
existing prohibition against vague criminal laws. However, it would permit cities to
implement strategies requiring police discretion, as long as those strategies avoid traditional
criminal investigation, prosecution, and punishment. Such an approach would force cities
either to adopt nontraditional responses to public safety problems or to be scrutinized under
the traditional rules governing criminal law and procedure.

INTRODUCTION
Community policing is the bandwagon of modem law enforcement t
and has quickly led to a burgeoning debate regarding the appropriateness
of neighborhood self-governance and the enforcement of social norms as
local crime control methods. An emerging and influential group of
scholars defends the delegation of discretion to police officers
attempting to enforce often ambiguous community norms.2 These
scholars argue that at least some forms of community support and
involvement in police programs serve as adequate substitutes for
traditional judicial scrutiny of police discretion, particularly the
1. See WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING, CHICAGO STYLE at

vi (1997) ("The concept [of community policing] is so popular with the public and city councils that
scarcely a chief wants his department to be known for failing to climb on this bandwagon."); Tracey
L. Meares, A Colloquium on Community Policing: Prayingfor Community Policing, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 1593 (2002) (noting that the term community policing "has become ubiquitous among lawenforcement practitioners and scholars" and collecting sources that use the term).
2. See infra Part .B-C for a discussion of the role of police discretion in the new policing models
and a summary of the new discretion scholarship defending that discretion.
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prohibition against vague criminal laws. On the other side of the debate
are traditionalists who view the new policing and the theories of selfgovernance underlying it as threats to traditional civil libertarian values
protected by well-established constitutional law.
This Article takes an initial step at refraining the debate by attempting
to reconcile at least some new policing forms with existing constitutional
jurisprudence governing the criminal justice system. The Article has two
primary goals. First, the Article critiques the new policing scholarship.
Drawing on my own experiences as a "Neighborhood District Attorney"
in Portland, Oregon, I argue that the rhetoric of community can be used
to disguise similarities between traditional law enforcement models and
at least some new policing initiatives. By using the malleable concept of
"community" to distinguish the traditional from the new, some new
policing advocates would permit cities to avoid the constitutional rules
that usually govern law enforcement by dressing up traditional initiatives
as "community-oriented."
A second goal is to develop a more meaningful distinction among
new policing programs. Where the current advocates of the new policing
attempt to draw lines between programs based on the role of
neighborhood governance, this Article advocates a distinction between
civil and criminal initiatives. Whether one's notion of criminal
punishment is retributive or utilitarian, traditional criminal law operates
by punishing individual offenders for past acts. Much of the new
policing, in contrast, involves the implementation of long-term programs
that seek to prevent violations of the criminal law through means other
than criminal punishment. Distinguishing between programs based upon
their "programmatic purpose ' 4 would result in increased judicial
tolerance for some forms of police discretion, but would do so without
eradicating the jurisprudence that appropriately limits discretion in the
criminal context.
This Article critiques the new discretion scholarship and develops the
alternative "programmatic purpose" model in three sections. Part I
3. See infra notes 193-200 and accompanying text for an overview of the scholarship criticizing
the new policing scholarship.
4. 1 use the term "programmatic purpose" as it is used by the U.S. Supreme Court in its recent
"special needs" jurisprudence. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 82 (2001) (holding
that a public hospital's drug testing program for pregnant women did not advance a special need
because its programmatic purpose was to generate evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution);
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45-48 (2000) (holding that the special needs doctrine
requires judicial examination of programmatic purpose and striking down a drug interdiction
checkpoint because its programmatic purpose was general crime control).
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provides an overview of the new policing models and the emerging
scholarship defending police discretion. Part II draws upon my own
experiences in a community prosecution unit to argue that the new
policing models do not warrant an overhaul in the constitutional rules
that govern the criminal justice system. While retention of the current
regime would limit police discretion in enforcing laws with a punitive
purpose, criminal justice jurisprudence would not hinder new policing
efforts reflecting a non-punitive programmatic purpose.
Part III fleshes out the programmatic purpose model in more detail. It
does so first through example. Portland's Drug Free Zone ordinance
enables police to control public spaces in high-crime neighborhoods by
excluding targeted individuals from discrete geographic areas. Applying
the U.S. Supreme Court's developing jurisprudence on criminal
punishment, I argue that this form of neighborhood exclusion is not a
criminal sanction because individuals are excluded only temporarily and
from a relatively small portion of the city, and are not arrested unless
they violate the exclusion order. After concluding that neighborhood
exclusion does not necessarily constitute criminal punishment, I turn to
an analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in City of Chicago v.
Morales5 and argue that the Court should have determined as a threshold
matter whether Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance imposed a
criminal or civil restraint before holding that it was intolerably vague.
Finally, Part III discusses the advantages of the programmatic purpose
model over the current new discretion scholarship.
I.

THE NEW POLICING MODELS AND NEW DISCRETION
SCHOLARSHIP

To understand what is "new" about the new policing, it is helpful to
contrast it with its immediate predecessor. The prevailing model of
policing over the past forty years has been dominated by an emphasis on6
rapid responses to 911 calls and subsequent criminal case creation.
Anyone who has seen a few episodes of the television series "Law &
Order" is familiar with the traditional role of police in what this Article
calls the rapid-response model of policing.7

5. 527 U.S. 41 (1999).

6. See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 565-73 (1997) (summarizing the
reform era of policing, including its emphasis on responding to citizen calls and making arrests).
7. The long-running

television series "Law & Order"

commences with the familiar
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In rapid-response policing, a crime's occurrence is what triggers the
involvement of law enforcement. Once the crime is reported, the
criminal justice system seeks to identify, arrest, prosecute, and punish
the crime's perpetrator. The rules of criminal procedure, investigatory
techniques, and criminal intelligence are means to that end. In pursuit of
that common end, each actor within the criminal justice system
maintains her own, distinct role. Police get involved after the crime
occurs, prosecutors join in only after an arrest is made, and corrections
officers play a role only post-conviction.
American cities have increasingly departed from rapid-response
policing over the past decade by turning to forms of policing that
emphasize an ongoing, proactive role in maintaining order, rather than
simply responding to crimes as they occur.8 Although policy makers
commonly describe the new policing trend9 as "community policing,"
one purpose of this Article is to question the meaningfulness of
community participation in these emerging forms of policing.
Accordingly, this Article uses the alternative term of "new policing
models."
Looking beyond the rhetoric of "community" is especially important
in light of that term's steadily increasing influence on the criminal
justice system. The concept of community policing blossomed during
the 1990s as the centerpiece of President Clinton's anti-crime efforts)10

announcement: "In the criminal justice system, the people are represented by two separate yet
equally important groups: the police who investigate crime and the district attorneys who prosecute
the offenders. These are their stories." See, e.g., Law & Order: 3 Dawg Night (NBC television
broadcast, Nov. 28, 2001).
8. See Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 420 (2000) ("[O]ur
policing strategies in the last decade have turned heavily towards prevention of crimes... rather
than individual events."); Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371,
377 (2001) (referring to "new policing" as a "large-scale structural trend.., geared toward fostering
norms of order in public spaces"); David Thacher, Conflicting Values in Community Policing, 35
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 765, 765 (2001) (stating that community policing "remains the dominant model
of police reform today").
9. To some degree, this trend is "new" only when viewed in a relatively narrow historical context.
Prior to the emergence of rapid-response policing, the United States experienced an earlier era of
law enforcement when police practiced an ongoing order-maintenance function. For a history of
modem policing environments, see Livingston, supra note 6, at 565-73 (documenting the "reform
era" at the turn of the twentieth century, which brought increased professionalism and autonomy to
law enforcement) and George L. Kelling & Mark H. Moore, From Political To Reform To
Community: The Evolving Strategy of Police, in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 311 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 1988) (noting law enforcement's twentieth
century shift away from social welfare work toward a narrow focus on crime control).
10. In his 1994 State of the Union Address, President Clinton vowed to place 100,000
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By 1999, a majority of police departments boasted community policing
programs, and a fifth of all local police officers in the nation were
designated as community policing officers."l
The scholarship examining the new policing models assumes that the
models are defined by partnerships between law enforcement and
community. 12 However, were community policing simply a term to
describe increased cooperation between police and residents, there might
be little to debate among criminal and constitutional law scholars. At the
heart of the new community-oriented crime control efforts lies more than
just an increased emphasis on community involvement. Much of the new
policing is premised on the claim that neighborhoods should be
permitted to establish governing norms of behavior, enforced by the
police.13 In an attempt to enforce social norms in public spaces, cities
have enacted or increased the enforcement of ordinances establishing
curfews and prohibiting panhandling, public intoxication, public

community-oriented police officers on America's streets. President William Clinton, State of the
Union Address (Jan. 28, 1994), 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 148, 155-56 (Jan. 31, 1994). Within
a year, the Department of Justice created its Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
(COPS) to accomplish that goal by expanding community policing and distributing grant funds to
support local community policing projects. Ted Gest, Symposium: Leadership Issues in Criminal
Justice Policy: The Evolution of Crime and Politics in America, 33 McGEORGE L. REV. 759, 762
(2002) (discussing expansion of local police forces by the COPS program).
11. This change was a quick one. In 1997, only 4% of local police officers were designated
community policing officers, and approximately one third of local police departments had full-time
officers engaged in community policing activities. In 1999, 21% of all police officers were
designated community policing officers, and 64% of local police departments-representing 86% of
the nation's population served by local police-had full-time officers working on community
policing projects. MATTHEW J. HICKMAN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS

SPECIAL REPORT: COMMUNITY POLICING IN LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 1997 & 1999 2 (Feb.
2001, rev. Mar. 2003).
12. See Heymann, supra note 8, at 420 (noting that new policing models use the help of those in a
neighborhood); Livingston, supra note 6, at 575 (noting community policing's emphasis on
community involvement); Meares, supra note I, at 1600 (noting that community involvement is one
of the "key forces" shaping community policing).
13. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349,
367-77 (1997) (discussing the enforcement of social norms in new policing efforts); Livingston,
supra note 6, at 578-84 (same); Schragger, supra note 8, at 382 (noting that the new policing is
based on "a claim that communities. . at the level of the neighborhood-not only can but should
effect basic changes in the fundamental rules that govern relations between the state and the
individual, as well as among individuals"); Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community Policing,and the
Social Norms Approach to Crime Control: Should One Make Us More Comfortable with the
Others?, 34 GA. L. REV. 1253, 1256-58 (2000) (discussing the enforcement of social norms in new
policing efforts).
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camping, graffiti, unlicensed street vending, and loitering, often in the
name of the "community."' 4
The fascination with the enforcement of community norms is not
limited to police departments. Prosecutors' offices around the country
have developed so-called "community prosecution" units, moving
prosecutors out of courthouses and into neighborhoods to address public
safety concerns directly. 15 Court systems have created specialized
community courts to dispose of the many low-level offenses resulting
from the increasing criminalization of disorder.16
From the new policing has emerged a growing body of legal
scholarship questioning whether current constitutional jurisprudence is
appropriate for evaluating the constitutionality of the new policing
efforts. This Part provides an overview of the new policing approaches
and the responding scholarship.

14. See, e.g., PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE §§ 14B.20.010-.070 (2002) (creating "drug free zones"
from which drug offenders can be excluded); Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 302-06 (9th
Cir. 1996) (upholding a Seattle ordinance prohibiting sitting or lying on sidewalks); Loper v.
NYPD, 999 F.2d 699, 701-06 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding unconstitutional an ordinance prohibiting
loitering for the purpose of begging); Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1562-84 (S.D.
Fla. 1992) (enjoining enforcement against the homeless of prohibitions against sleeping and eating
in public); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1217-19 (1996)
(discussing laws targeting low-level offenses); Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging To
Differ: The First Amendment and the Right To Beg, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896, 896-97 n.l (1991)
(summarizing laws targeting begging); Brian Privor, Dusk 'Til Dawn: Children's Rights and the
Effectiveness of Juvenile Curfew Ordinances, 79 B.U. L. REV. 415 (1999) (discussing juvenile
curfews); Schragger, supranote 8, at 378 (discussing laws targeting low-level offenses).
15. See generally Barbara Boland, Community Prosecution: Portland's Experience, in
COMMUNITY JUSTICE: AN EMERGING FIELD 253-77 (David R. Karp ed., 1998) (discussing
community prosecution) [hereinafter Boland (Portland)]; Anthony V. Alfieri, A Colloquium on
Community Policing: Community Prosecutors, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1465 (2002) (same); Barbara
Boland, What is Community Prosecution?, NAT'L INST. OF JUST. J.,Aug. 1996, at 35 (same)
[hereinafter Boland (NIJ)]; Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 321 (2002) (same).
16. John J.Ammann, Addressing Quality of Life Crimes in Our Cities: Criminalization,
Community Courts and Community Compassion, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 811, 815-19 (2000)
(discussing development of community courts to resolve charges for quality of life offenses);
Quintin Johnstone, The Hartford Community Court: An Experiment That Has Succeeded, 34 CONN.
L. REV. 123, 123-24 (2001) (noting the rapid proliferation of community courts nationwide);
Anthony C. Thompson, Courting Disorder: Some Thoughts on Community Courts, 10 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 63, 63 (2002) ("Specialized 'community courts' have burst onto the judicial landscape
almost overnight.") (internal footnote and citation omitted).
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The New Policing

Although distinctions can-indeed, should-be drawn among various
new policing models, a handful of characteristics separate these models
from rapid-response policing. First, new policing models tend to address
the needs of specific neighborhoods, rather than apply the same general
policing approach throughout the department's jurisdiction.17 For
example, police might depart from the traditional rapid-response model

by stepping up enforcement against a specific type of crime, such as
prostitution, that plagues only one district in the city. A nearby district,
however, might suffer more than its fair share of car thefts, requiring a
different strategy a few miles away within the same jurisdiction.
Second, as

part of this

focus

on the problems

of specific

neighborhoods, the new policing models tend to incorporate increased
involvement of citizens and enhanced citizen-police partnerships.' 8 The
rapid-response model looks to citizens as crime reporters and witnesses.

While traditional

policing

methods

value citizen

assistance

in

identifying, locating, and prosecuting offenders, they do Pot look to
citizens to shape the priorities of the police department. New policing
models, in contrast, tend to look to community "stakeholders,"', 9 like
neighborhood residents and business owners, to identify the public

17. See Archon Fung, Beyond and Below the New Urbanism: Citizen Participation and
Responsive Spatial Reconstruction, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 615, 629 (2001) (discussing
variations among community groups in selecting priorities and responsive approaches); Heymann,
supra note 8, at 421, 423-24 (discussing the concentration of police resources by neighborhoods
and "the fact that police are accountable to neighborhoods as well as to cities").
18. See Mark H. Moore, Problem-Solving and Community Policing, in 15 CRIME & JUSTICE: A
REVIEW OF RESEARCH: MODERN POLICING 99, 126 (1992) (noting that community policing focuses
on "cooperation with the community"); Wesley G. Skogan, Community Organizationsand Crime,
in 10 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 39,40 (1988) ("The community approach to crime
prevention emphasizes collaboration between the criminal justice system and community
organizations."); Thacher, supra note 8, at 765 (stating that the building of partnerships is one of
community policing's "boldest and most difficult aims" and "arguably its core ideal").
19. Of the terms that emerge repeatedly from the jargon that surrounds community justice
programs, the term "stakeholder" appears to be a favorite, referring not just to residents but to
"practically everyone" who might care about what happens to a neighborhood. See Jeffrey Fagan &
Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 502 (2000) (discussing the role of "stakeholders" in shaping norms under
new policing approaches); Joan W. Howarth, Toward the Restorative Constitution: A Restorative
Justice Critique of Anti-Gang Public Nuisance Injunctions, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 717, 720
(2000) (noting the importance of "stakeholder" agreement in restorative justice programs); Tracey
L. Meares, Norms. Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 410 (2000) (noting that
participation of community "stakeholders" legitimizes government action); Thacher, supra note 8,
at 765 (noting that community policing attempts to incorporate "practically everyone").
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safety problems specific to that community and to develop and
implement strategies to solve those problems.
A third trend among the new policing models, emphasis on low-level
criminal offenses, may follow from the second. Few citizens are troubled
on a day-to-day basis by the murder, rape, and major assault cases that
police, prosecutors, and courts traditionally prioritize.2 ° What bothers
them are the street-level drug dealers, prostitutes, drunks, noise makers,
and vandals who remind them on a daily basis that their neighborhood is
not what they wish it to be. The new policing models tend to address
these so-called "quality of life" offenses. 1
The new policing's emphasis on low-level offenses stems in part from
James Wilson and George Kelling's influential 1982 essay, "Broken
Windows., 22 The broken windows theory maintains that low-level
disorder-such as loitering, public intoxication, and litteringcontributes to more serious crime if left uncorrected.23 Wilson and
Kelling suggested that disorder can contribute to overall crime in two
separate ways. First, the appearance of disorder can create fear among
community residents, who will begin to stay indoors, withdraw from
their community, and eventually stop trying to assert control over the
neighborhood. 24 Second, low-level crime and disorder may lead directly
to an increase in crime by breaking down community standards and
signaling to lawbreakers that "no one cares" enough about the
community to enforce the law.25 Under the direct component of the
theory, then, disorder is essentially contagious, and one broken window,
20. See Heymann, supra note 8, at 444 (noting that traditional policing prioritized offenses by
their severity); Kelling & Moore, supra note 9, at 60 (maintaining that the historical prioritization of
serious offenses stems from those "who think the enduring social interest in non-intrusive and fair
policing can best be served by focusing attention on a few serious and visible crimes"); Livingston,
supra note 6, at 578 (noting that citizens' highest law enforcement priorities are low-level disorders
such as abandoned buildings, vandalism, gangs, loitering juveniles, and unsafe parks); Thacher,
supra note 8, at 776 (noting disjoint between traditional police prioritization of serious crimes and
community groups' concern about "soft crime" such as rowdy youths, barking dogs, and physical
decay); George L. Kelling, Policing and Communities: The Quiet Revolution, PERSP. ON POLICING

(Nat'l Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Washington, D.C.), June 1988, at 2 (also noting lowlevel nature of community concerns).
21. See Livingston, supra note 6, at 558-59 (noting the new police focus on "promoting the
'quality of life' in public spaces").
22. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at
29-38.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 32-33.
25. Id. at 31.
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if left unrepaired, can lead to the rest of the windows being broken. To
heighten law-abiding residents' confidence in their neighborhoods and to
prevent the progression of disorder, Wilson and Kelling advocated a
26
police function in reducing minor but visible social disorder.
Wilson and Kelling's article has influenced not just criminal justice
theory, but also police strategies in the field.2 7 For example, based on the
broken windows theory, former New York City mayor Rudolph Giuliani
employed an aggressive, "zero-tolerance" policing approach, directing
officers to increase arrests for such low-level crimes as subway turnstile
jumping, public intoxication and urination, jaywalking, unlicensed street
vending, and window-squeegeeing.2 8 Although critics question the
efficacy of the zero-tolerance approach, 9 the notable decrease in New
York City's crime rate during the 1990s has been widely attributed to the
Giuliani strategy.3 °
Finally, a fourth defining characteristic of the new policing models is
the desire to develop programmatic responses to specific problems in
order to prevent future occurrences. The rapid-response model's
immediate objective is to arrest and punish an individual offender.
Through specific and general deterrence, the punishment of that
individual offender and others like him might lead to an overall decrease
in crime, but the immediate objective is case-creation. In contrast, the

26. Id. at 38.
27. See Livingston, supra note 6, at 583-85 (discussing the influence of the broken windows
theory on contemporary policing).
28. Judith A. Greene, Zero Tolerance: A Case Study of Police Policies and Practicesin New York
City, 45 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 171, 172 (1999); Thompson, supranote 16, at 84; Waldeck, supra
note 13, at 1275-78.
29. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN

WINDOWS POLICING 90-104 (2001) (questioning the efficacy of order-maintenance policing);
Greene, supra note 28, at 177-81 (suggesting alternative explanations for New York City's crime
rate decrease during the 1990s).
30. See, e.g., WILLIAM BRATTON WITH PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND: How AMERICA'S TOP

COP REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC 152-56 (1998) (discussing New York City's implementation
of the broken windows theory); Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the
Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, The Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance
Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 293 (1998) (noting that "it is today practically
impossible to find a single scholarly article that takes issue with the quality-of-life initiative");
Kahan, supra note 13, at 368-69 (noting the decline in New York City's crime rates and stating that
"city officials and at least some criminologists credit the larger reduction in crime rates to [the]
emphasis on 'order maintenance'). But see Jeffrey Fagan et al., Declining Homicide in New York
City: A Tale of Two Trends, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1277, 1322 (1988) (maintaining that
"the pattern in New York City is much more consistent with gun-oriented policing than with
indiscriminate quality-of-life interventions as a cause of decline").

Unpacking New Policing

new policing models incorporate the influential work of Herman
Goldstein 3' by treating the prevention of future occurrences as the
primary objective. 32 Goldstein called into question the prevailing rapidresponse model of policing, where police resources were squandered on
chasing down individual suspects after crimes had already occurred.3 3
He argued that police would be more effective if they spent more time
seeking to prevent or reduce long-term, recurring problems instead of
responding to individual crime occurrences. 34 In Goldstein's view, the
response should be tailored to the particular problem and should look
beyond formal law enforcement methods. 35 Adopting this concept of
"problem-oriented" policing, the new policing models attempt to
identify the most effective response to a community problem, which
may not require increased arrests and prosecutions.36
The new policing's emphasis on problem-solving instead of casecreation may very well be inherent in its prioritization of low-level
criminal offenses. Rapid-response policing is particularly ill-suited to
low-level crimes. Unless a low-level offender is caught red-handed,
police are unlikely to identify and locate the offender without expending
resources that would outweigh that single offense's importance. Even if
a low-level offender is identified and arrested, the criminal justice
system is ill-suited to remedy a neighborhood's ongoing problems.
Prostitutes, vandals, and the publicly intoxicated serve short sentences or

31. HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING (1990) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN,
PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING]; Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented
Approach, 25 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 236 (1979) [hereinafter Goldstein, Improving Policing].
32. See Heymann, supra note 8, at 423 (noting Goldstein's role in encouraging police to treat

crime prevention as a primary goal, focusing more on general problems than on individual
incidents); Livingston, supra note 6, at 573-75 (discussing Goldstein's influence on modem
policing environments).
33. Goldstein, Improving Policing,supra note 31, at 245.
34. See generally GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING, supranote 31, at 32-49, 102-03.
35. Seeid. at 103-04.
36. See Gest, supra note 10, at 762 (listing problem-oriented policing as a move away from the
rapid-response model); Lawrence Rosenthal, Policing and Equal Protection, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 53, 53 (2003) (discussing problem-oriented policing). Of course, new policing methods may
result in increased arrests and prosecutions if these are determined to be the most effective response
to a community problem. What distinguishes problem-oriented policing from the rapid-response
model is its willingness to prevent future crimes without generating additional cases for the criminal

justice system. See Livingston, supra note 6, at 573-74 (noting that under problem-oriented
policing, traditional law enforcement may be "only one method among many" in a response to
public safety concerns).
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receive probationary sentences, then return to the same corners to
provoke the same community complaints.
B.

New Policing and PoliceDiscretion

The new policing models inevitably require police to exercise
discretion. The police may turn to the community to identify law
enforcement priorities in community policing, but the community may
identify more concerns than the police are able to tackle effectively,
requiring police to choose among them. Problem-solving policing 37 calls
for discretion in choosing among non-traditional alternatives to reducing
systemic problems. Even so-called zero-tolerance policing 38 calls for
police discretion; it is inconceivable in a world of limited resources that
police fully enforce the penal code in every instance.39
The most controversial need for discretion, however, arises from a
legislative inability to define with precision the "disorder" that police
should seek to eradicate. Although police can reduce disorder indirectly
by enforcing non-vague prohibitions against prostitution, littering,
graffiti, and vandalism, any broad attempt to criminalize deviations from
community norms is bound to be vague. The new policing's inevitable
reliance upon police discretion raises potential conflicts with existing
judicial limitations upon such discretion, including the void for
vagueness doctrine.
Particularly during the Warren Court years, the U.S. Supreme Court
made limiting the exercise of police discretion a primary purpose of
constitutional jurisprudence in the criminal arena. 40 As part of this effort,
the Court has held that vague criminal laws offend the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of due process. For example, in Papachristouv.
City of Jacksonville,4' the Court unanimously held void for vagueness a
37. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text for discussion of problem-solving policing.
38. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text for discussion of the zero-tolerance policing
model.
39. See David Cole, Foreword: Discretion and DiscriminationReconsidered: A Response To the
New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1064 (1999); Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L.
Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1170 (1998)
(noting that even under New York City's aggressive order-maintenance approach, police retain
"considerable latitude" about whether, where, and against whom to enforce the law).
40. See Cole, supra note 39, at 1060 ("At least since Earl Warren's tenure as Chief Justice of the
U.S. Supreme Court in the 1950s and 1960s, limiting police discretion has been a central focus of
constitutional criminal jurisprudence."); A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal
Procedure,67 MICH. L. REV. 249,255-56 (1968).
41. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
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city ordinance that punished those "strolling around from place to place
without any lawful purpose," not
to mention jugglers and men who lived
42
off the earnings of their wives.
Three values have been offered to justify the Court's constitutional
prohibition against vague criminal laws.43 First, a vague criminal law
fails to give notice to the citizenry of the boundary between legal and
criminal activity.44 That this failure of notice is seen as fundamentally
unfair suggests, at least implicitly, a value placed on the citizenry's
ability to walk with confidence all the way to the line of criminal
conduct without fear of crossing it. 45 Second, vague criminal laws are
criticized for permitting police arbitrariness.4 6 By allowing police
officers to interpret the scope of its prohibition, a vague criminal law
entrusts police officers with discretion to decide whom to arrest for a
criminal offense. Finally, courts have articulated concerns that vague
criminal laws could chill protected activities, such as speech or
association.4 7 In this respect, the void for vagueness doctrine provides an
42. Id. at 170-71. The ordinance authorized police to arrest:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common gamblers,
persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night
walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and
lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, persons
wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object,
habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually
spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where
alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually living upon the
earnings of their wives or minor children[.]
Id. at 156-57 n.1. See also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983) (striking down as
unconstitutionally vague a California statute requiring those found "loiter[ing] or wander[ing] upon
the streets or from place to place without apparent reason or business" to provide a "credible and
reliable" identification and reason for their presence when requested to do so by a police officer).
43. For a general discussion of the void for vagueness doctrine in criminal cases, see I WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 2.3 (1986), and Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67
(1960).
44. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357; Papachristou,405 U.S. at 162; Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269
U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (providing that criminal statutes must define the offense with sufficient clarity
for an ordinary person to understand what conduct is prohibited).
45. The importance of fair notice underlies other criminal law rules as well. For example,
consider the values reflected in the rule of lenity, providing that ambiguities in criminal statutes
should be resolved by construing the statute narrowly. The Court has stated that the rule of lenity
reflects in part the principle that "a fair warning should be given to the world... of what the law
intends to do if a certain line is passed" and that "the line should be clear." United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971) (internal citations omitted).
46. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357 (holding that criminal prohibitions must be defined "in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement").
47. In Papachristou,for example, the Court likened the perceived virtues of "strolling" and
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avenue for the judiciary's substantive review of legislative
decisionmaking.4 8
The Court's decision in City of Chicago v. Morales49 to strike down
Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance has raised the question of
whether the void for vagueness doctrine creates an unnecessary barrier
to new policing methods. Chicago enacted the ordinance in response to
pervasive gang activity in its inner-city neighborhoods.5 ° In contrast to
rapid-response policing, the ordinance attempted to reduce gang control
over neighborhoods proactively through problem-solving policing.51
Rather than direct police officers to arrest offenders for the serious
crimes that often result from gang activity, the ordinance authorized
police officers to issue verbal orders to disperse if a group of two or
more people were loitering in a public place with no apparent purpose,
and if the officer reasonably believed that at least one person within the
group was a member of a "criminal street gang." 52 Violation of the order
to disperse was a misdemeanor offense. 53 A six-member majority of the
Court struck down Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance as
unconstitutionally vague, holding that the Chicago City Council failed to
"establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement" when it
instructed officers to issue dispersal orders to groups loitering with "no
apparent purpose., 54 The void for vagueness doctrine prohibited the
Chicago City Council from protecting neighborhoods from pervasive
gang intimidation by deferring
to the "'moment-to-moment judgment of
55
the policeman on his beat.'

"loafing" to the values reflected in the writings of Walt Whitman and Henry D. Thoreau, freedoms
that have "encouraged lives of high spirits rather than hushed, suffocating silence." 405 U.S. at 16364.
48. See Ellickson, supra note 14, at 1210-11 (noting that the Papachristou decision treated the
city's attempt to control the use of public spaces as the "suppression of high spirits in favor of drab
conformity"); Livingston, supra note 6, at 621-27 (discussing the void for vagueness doctrine as
substantive, not procedural, review).
49. 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
50. Id. at 46-47.
51. See id (summarizing findings of the Chicago City Council). See supra notes 31-36 and
accompanying text for discussion of problem-solving policing.
52. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 47 (summarizing CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 8-4-015 (2002)).

53. Id.
54. Id. at 60-64 (holding that anti-gang loitering ordinance entrusted too much discretion to
police officers to determine which types of loitering "purposes" were lawful) (quoting Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)).
55. Id. at 60 (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 360).
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C.

The New Discretion Scholarship

Because the Court relied on the void for vagueness doctrine to strike
down one of the first new policing initiatives to reach the Court, the
doctrine has become the target of new policing advocates who maintain
that police discretion is essential to the enforcement of social norms.
Relying heavily on the new policing models, an influential group of
scholars has argued that a changed political landscape mitigates the need
for judicially-imposed limitations on police discretion. They argue that,
where vagrancy laws were once used to marginalize racial minorities,
today's police exercise discretion to the benefit of and often at the behest
of inner-city communities. Police discretion, the argument further goes,
is not only inevitable, but in fact helpful if exercised to enforce social
norms in a way that aids normatively-worthy communities. These "new
discretion" scholars advocate a two-tiered criminal justice jurisprudence
in which the level of judicial scrutiny of police discretion turns on
whether the challenged program constitutes new policing.56
Debra Livingston, for example, asserts that "quality-of-life" offenses
with low-level sanctions should not be reviewed under the void for
vagueness doctrine.57 She argues that "rule-like," specific laws are
inevitably imperfect in capturing the disorderly conduct that a
community seeks to prohibit and, therefore, police will inevitably
exercise discretion in deciding against whom to enforce such
ordinances. 58 She argues:
When public order laws do not appear aimed at the exclusion of
groups or individuals from participation in a community's public
life, but rather at the articulation of reasonable behavioral
standards in the interest of preserving public spaces,
communities should not be prevented from replacing the
Papachristou regime with a new legal regime in which more
contextualized, conduct-based prohibitions authorize police to
perform order maintenance tasks. 59
When laws are vague, she argues, police discretion can be managed
through other means, such as political accountability, community
56. Cole, supranote 39, at 1062 (coining the term "new discretion" scholarship).
57. Livingston, supra note 6, at 562; see also Ellickson, supra note 14, at 1243-46 (advocating

informal zoning of public spaces with respect to disorder and advocating discretionary enforcement
in the most orderly zones of vagrancy and disorderly conduct laws).
58. Livingston, supra note 6, at 618, 647-50.
59. Id. at 647.
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monitoring, internal enforcement guidelines, and sunset provisions on
ordinances that delegate police authority.6 °
Similarly, Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares have argued that "exacting
judicial scrutiny of routine policing functions" and judicial "hostility
toward discretion ' 61 are no longer warranted in contemporary urban
crime control.62 They assert that these components of modem criminal
procedure jurisprudence were necessary during the Warren Court years
when majority groups used selective enforcement of vague criminal
statutes as a critical component of the institutionalized racism that
subordinated minority groups. 6 3 In contrast to its less benevolent
predecessor, discretion invoked in the new policing is to the benefit ofand often at the behest of-minority groups in urban communities that
are exercising increasing political power.64 Kahan and Meares argue that
the new policing enhances liberty in inner-city neighborhoods by
altering destructive and constraining norm perceptions, such as the
expectation that a young man should carry a gun or join a gang,65 and by
providing a less draconian law enforcement alternative to long prison
sentences.66 They also argue that members of inner-city communities are
"practically and morally" in a better position than civil libertarians and
judges to strike the proper balance between liberty and order.67
Kahan and Meares argue that the modern regime of criminal
procedure should be abandoned in favor of a model that considers the
emergence of African-American political strength.68 Specifically, they
60. Id.at 650-70.
61. Kahan & Meares, supra note 39, at 1158-59 (noting that two central features of the modem
criminal procedure regime are "its authorization of exacting judicial scrutiny of routine policing
functions" and "its hostility toward discretion").
62. Id.at 1166-71.
63. Id.
64. Id.at 1163-64 (noting the support for community policing among African-Americans and
maintaining that the "new community policing is an outgrowth" of demand within AfricanAmerican communities for increased protections of law enforcement).
65. Id.
at 1168-69, 1181-82; see also Lawrence Rosenthal, Gang Loitering and Race,91 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 99, 129 (2000) (arguing that gang influence on "community mores" undermines
the inner cities' chances for revitalization). For further discussion of the reinforcement of social
norms to stabilize neighborhoods, see Kahan, supra note 13, at 367-77, Livingston, supra note 6, at
578-84, and Waldeck, supra note 13, at 1299-308.

66. Kahan & Meares, supra note 39, at 1169; see also Rosenthal, supra note 36, at 58; Schragger,
supra note 8, at 441; William J.Stuntz, Race,Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1836-38
(1998).
67. Kahan & Meares, supra note 39, at 1177-80.
68. Id.at 1171.
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advocate a political process theory of criminal procedure jurisprudence,
in which courts would defer to the political process and uphold the
delegation of discretion to police as long as the burden of the police
procedures falls on the average member of the community or those with
a "linked fate" to the governing majority. 69 Applying this political
process theory, Kahan and Meares would permit some communityoriented programs to avoid not only the prohibition against vague laws,
but also other rules limiting police discretion, such as the Fourth
Amendment's general requirement that
searches be conducted pursuant
70
to a warrant based on probable cause.
Randall Kennedy shares Kahan and Meares's belief that traditional
liberal concern about the effects of law enforcement on AfricanAmerican defendants is misplaced in light of the disproportionate effect
of crime on African-American victims. 71 Because the African-American
community suffers the most from the commission of criminal offenses,
he argues, the community's problem with the criminal law is not its
over-enforcement, but its under-enforcement.72
Robert Ellickson shares many of the same concerns as Livingston,
Kahan, and Meares, but approaches urban quality-of-life problems from
a zoning perspective. 73 He argues that communities could be zoned
pursuant to their tolerance for disorder.74 In the most orderly zones,
prohibitions against panhandling and loitering would be enforced,
thereby relegating such activity to the less orderly zones.75 Like
Livingston, Kahan, and Meares, Ellickson criticizes judicial
69. Id. at 1171-75.
70. Id.
71. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 19 (1997).

72. Id.; see also Rosenthal, supra note 65, at 130 (emphasizing the need for enhanced policing as
part of inner-city revitalization). Like Kahan and Meares, Kennedy believes that victimization by
crime is now a larger burden on the everyday lives of African-Americans than the mistreatment of
suspects and criminal defendants. KENNEDY, supra note 71, at 19. Although Kennedy shares Kahan
and Meares's belief that African-Americans benefit from enforcement of criminal law, he does not
share their view on one of the first new policing efforts to be reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
While Kahan and Meares worked to support Chicago's gang loitering ordinance, invalidated as
vague in Morales, Kennedy co-authored an amicus brief opposing the ordinance. See Brief of Amici
Curiae Chi. Alliance for Neighborhood Safety et al. in Support of Respondents, City of Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (No. 97-1121); see also Cole, supra note 39, at 1069 & n.59
(observing that while Kennedy has not directly assailed the vagueness doctrine, Kahan and Meares
have relied critically on his claim that black communities need more, not less, law enforcement).
73. Ellickson, supranote 14, at 1219-46.
74. Id. at 1219-26.
75. Id. at 1221-22.
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decisionmaking during the late 1960s and early 1970s, including the
void for vagueness doctrine, to the extent that the Court "seemed blind
to the fact that their constitutional rulings might adversely affect the
quality of urban life and the viability of city centers., 7 6 He maintains that
federal courts should refrain from restricting the authority of state and
local legislative bodies to craft laws responding to local conditions.77
Mark Rosen emphasizes geographic boundaries from a different
perspective, arguing for increased judicial tolerance of self-governance
through the creation of geographic nonuniformity of constitutional
requirements. 8 In Rosen's view, courts should apply the void for
vagueness doctrine contextually for at least some communities. For
example, he maintains that the Morales Court, instead of pondering the
possibility that the anti-gang loitering ordinance would be applied to
innocent people waiting for a taxi or resting from a jog, could have
inquired whether the ordinance "was sufficiently definite to persons
living in a city thick with street gangs. 79
Underlying the new discretion scholars' willingness to relax
constitutional doctrines that they perceive to be barriers to new policing
is their shared belief that community groups support and play an integral
part in the new policing models. Kahan and Meares, for example,
emphasize the popularity of the new policing efforts within inner-city
communities and argue that the support of racial minorities demonstrates
an even-handed application of the police initiatives.80 Livingston
similarly relies on community support when she defends many of the
public order laws at the heart of the new policing models by observing
that they do not aim to81exclude outsiders from "participation in a
community's public life."
76. Id. at 1213.
77. Id. at 1213-14.
78. Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution: Geographical Variations of Constitutional
Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1129, 1166-82 (1999).
79. Id. at 1174.

80. Kahan & Meares, supra note 39, at 1160-66; see also Dan M. Kahan, Privatizing Criminal
Law: Strategies for Private Norm Enforcement in the Inner City, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1863-65
(1999) (noting that government can gain legitimacy by working in partnership with private
organizations respected within the community). Although Kennedy has not challenged the
vagueness doctrine, he appears to share some of Kahan and Meares's views about the desire of
African-Americans for increased police protection. See KENNEDY, supra note 71, at 19 (arguing that

African-Americans desire more, not less, enforcement of criminal laws); see also Rosenthal, supra
note 36, at 56 (arguing that traditional law enforcement leaves the poor and vulnerable subject to a
higher risk of crime than the wealthy and powerful).
81. Livingston, supra note 6, at 647.
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New discretion scholars assume not only community support, but also
community involvement in the new policing. 82 Livingston, for example,
argues that internal police regulations and community monitoring of the
police department can be more effective checks on police discretion than
the void for vagueness doctrine. 83 Similarly, Sarah Waldeck emphasizes
the importance of "partnerships" between police and community as an
effective method of ensuring that police do not hide attempts to increase
felony arrests beneath the cover of enforcing community norms.8 4
II.

CRITIQUING THE NEW DISCRETION SCHOLARSHIP

New discretion scholars have brought a much-needed shift to criminal
law scholarship. Whereas criminal law scholars have traditionally
criticized the impact of judicial decisionmaking on offenders, the new
discretion scholars are concerned also about the consequences to
victimized inner-city residents.85 They recognize that the traditional
hostility of inner-city residents toward police arises not just from police
aggression toward their community, but also from the manifestation
among law enforcement of low expectations about the quality of life in
poor neighborhoods and increased tolerance for illegal activity against
minority residents.86 The new discretion scholars rightly enlarge the
82. See generally Randolph M. Grinc, "Angels in Marble ": Problems in Stimulating Community
Involvement in Community Policing, 40 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 437, 440-42 (1994) (discussing
why community participation is thought to be important in the new policing models). Grinc notes
that law enforcement seeks the participation of the community to enhance the community's
perception that police are responding to its concerns, to increase the community's sense of safety, to
improve community-police relations, and to decrease crime. Id. at 440-41. Grinc also observes that
most theorists stress the importance of community involvement even though they disagree about
why it is important. Id. at 440.
83. Livingston, supra note 6, at 659-67 (discussing internal regulation and civilian monitoring of
police discretion); see also Heymann, supra note 8, at 454-55 (maintaining that officer discretion
that is unlikely to be monitored judicially should be governed by departmental regulations).
84. Waldeck, supra note 13, at 1301. For example, Waldeck praises the Day Labor Project in
Glendale, California, where police work with activists, businesses, and social service providers to
create a central site for day laborers as an alternative to quality-of-life policing in a neighborhood
affected by the gathering of day laborers. Id. at 1302-04. Similarly, she discusses partnerships
between police and schools to combat truancy and juvenile crime. Id. at 1304-06.
85. As William Stuntz has recently noted, "everyone does and should care about both" police
overreaching and victimization by private parties,
because "the state of nature-a world free of all
risks of police coercion-is an unhappy place in many of the same ways that a police state is an
unhappy place." William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, Ill YALE L.J. 2137, 2146
(2002) (arguing that the scope of constitutional rights does and should change in response to broad
crime trends).
86. This view dates back to one of the earliest attempts to understand the relationship between
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concept of liberty beyond traditional civil libertarian notions to include a
basic sense of safety that privileged Americans take for granted. In doing
so, they recognize that a model government does more than simply
refrain from interference with the citizenry; it plays a role in
guaranteeing its safety.
Unfortunately, the new discretion scholarship reflects its concern for
real-world quality of life by concluding that community involvement in
law enforcement obviates the need for traditional constitutional
limitations upon police. That conclusion is flawed in several respects.
First, it gives constitutional significance to notions of community that
are often idealized and easily manipulated. Second, it assumes that a
community's support for and participation in a challenged police
initiative can be quantified accurately and will not fluctuate significantly
over time. A third flaw is the new discretion scholarship's emphasis
upon majority rule, which would deprive political minorities of
substantive judicial review of rights determinations resulting from the
political process. A fourth flaw is the failure to respect the values served
by traditional vagueness review. Finally, the reliance upon community
support as a substitute for the void for vagueness doctrine would create a
potentially limitless tolerance for police discretion. The remainder of this
Part discusses each of those flaws in turn.
A.

IdealizingNotions of "Community"

New discretion scholars' reliance on malleable notions of community
support and involvement to justify radical jurisprudential paradigm shifts
is troubling for several reasons. As a threshold matter, it is not obvious
that residents of a geographically-defined region comprise 87
a
"community" in anything other than the most superficial sense.
Granted, in inner-city neighborhoods, one's address shares a high
correlation with one's income and skin color,88 and at least some of the
police and minority communities. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CIVIL DISORDERS 161-62 (1968). The commission, popularly known as the Kemer Commission,
was established after the 1967 summer riots to study factors that contributed to the riots and to
suggest means of preventing reoccurrences. Id. at 1. The commission concluded that the riots
commenced

in part

because of antagonism between

police and inner-city

neighborhoods,

attributable not only to aggressive police tactics within those neighborhoods, but also to police
apathy about crimes against those neighborhoods. Id. at 157-62; see also Livingston, supra note 6,
at 571 (discussing Kerner Commission).
87. See infra Part ll.E for further discussion regarding the difficulty of defining communities.

88. Richard Ford, for example, has explained how the continuing correlation between race and
income contributes to the maintenance of "racially identified spaces." See Richard Thompson Ford,
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new discretion scholarship relies upon the notion of a meaningful
community among African-Americans. 89 Nevertheless, to assume the
existence of an identifiable community view within inner-city
neighborhoods is to ignore both the presence of other racial groups and
recent immigrants in those neighborhoods and the tensions that can exist
between them and African-Americans. 90 It also ignores the reality that
there is diversity of opinion among African-Americans
regarding crime,
9
police, and competing policy priorities. 1
Some new discretion scholars would argue that, even in the absence
of a community consensus, it is inner-city residents' improved
opportunity to participate fairly in the political process that is critical in
the new policing efforts. 92 Although representative forms of government
undoubtedly play a role in determining the "will" of the community, a
political process account of constitutional rules ignores the reality that
every community, however defined, has its outsiders "whose complaints
are least likely to be heard by the rest of the community. 93
Moreover, even if there were something resembling an empirically
identifiable consensus within a meaningfully defined community, it is
The Boundaries of Race: PoliticalGeography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1843, 1849-57
(1994).
89. Specifically, Tracey Meares has been especially effective in describing a "linked fate" among
African-Americans. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
90. See generally John 0. Calmore, Race/lsm Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty,
52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1067, 1110 & n.240 (1998) (discussing integration and segregation pattems of
recent Asian and Latino immigrants and the tensions that can exist between racial groups); Eric K.
Yamamoto, The Color Fault Lines: Asian American Justice from 2000, 8 ASIAN L.J. 153, 158
(2001) (discussing "color on color" conflicts).
91. See Regina Austin, "The Black Community, "Its Lawbreakers, and a Politicsof Identification,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1770 (1992) (noting a division among African-Americans regarding
whether the criminal justice system works too well or not well enough); Cole, supra note 39, at
1085 (noting that "inner-city communities, like all communities, do not speak with one voice");
Grinc, supra note 82, at 457-60 (noting heterogeneous populations and intragroup conflicts within
the "communities" targeted by community policing projects); Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime,
73 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 669, 689 (1998) (noting diversity within minority groups); see also JEROME
H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 254

(1993) (noting that communities are rare if defined as having "a commonality of interests,
traditions, identities, values, and expectations").
92. Kahan and Meares, for example, do not appear to require a true consensus among residents to
pass muster under their political process approach; approval by elected representatives is sufficient.
See Kahan & Meares, supra note 39, at 1175 (noting that, although individual residents in a public
housing project might not have approved of a search policy, they had the opportunity to participate
in the political process, and their elected officials had expressed support for the policy).
93. Cole, supra note 39, at 1083 (noting that "every 'community' will have its misfits, dissidents,
and outsiders").
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less than clear that new policing efforts actually identify that consensus.
Community policing efforts, for example, frequently look to
neighborhood organizations for support and partnerships. However, the
limited empirical research about community organizations indicates that
these groups reflect only a small proportion of residents and tend to be
dominated by homeowners and white residents in racially-mixed
94
neighborhoods.

Indeed, one of the few empirical studies of community participation
in community policing projects found nearly universal difficulties
stimulating and continuing citizen participation in community policing
projects, even though the projects were markedly different in their
approaches. 95 Studying eight early pilot community policing projects,
Randolph Grinc reported that "ordinary" residents within the areas
affected by the pilot programs usually had either no knowledge at all of
the programs or a vague idea that there was a new government program
operating in their neighborhoods. 96 Many tended to see the programs as
opportunities for neighborhood picnics and other social gatherings.9 7
Even among leaders of neighborhood groups, who demonstrated the
highest level of knowledge about the programs, few appeared to
98
understand fully the role of the community in the programs.
Importantly, Grinc reported that only a "small core group of residents"
was involved in the programs. 99
When only a small percentage of residents participate in
"partnerships" with police, there is no guarantee that these squeaky

94. See, e.g., Michael E. Buerger, A Tale of Two Targets: Limitations of Community Anticrime
Actions, in COMMUNITY JUSTICE: AN EMERGING FIELD, supra note 15, at 137-38 (noting that
membership in community crime-prevention groups is often low and tends to be dominated by
homeowners and by white residents in racially diverse neighborhoods); Skogan, supra note 18, at
68 (concluding that community organization is more likely to occur in "homogeneous, better-off
areas of cities").
95. See Grinc, supra note 82, at 442-64 (surveying data from eight pilot Innovative
Neighborhood-Oriented Policing programs funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance).
96. Id.at 442-44.
97. Id.at 444.
98. Id. at 456.
99. Id.at 445. Grine noted shared hurdles to police partnerships with community across the
programs. In addition to the community's lack of understanding about the programs, Grinc noted
problems presented by preexisting hostilities between police and the members of poor and minority
communities now being asked to participate, residents' fear of retaliation by neighborhood gangs
and drug-dealers, community distrust created by previous, short-lived, failed experiments in their
neighborhoods, police frustration with what they perceive as apathy within the community, and
diverse interests and infighting within the community. Id. at 446-60.
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wheels represent the will of the broader community. They may very well
be a vocal minority that happens to share law enforcement's priorities.
The following anecdote demonstrates the risks of placing too much
emphasis on the perception of community sentiment. From 1997 to
1999, I served as a member of the Multnomah County District
Attorney's Neighborhood District Attorney program, a nationallyrecognized program in Portland, Oregon, at the forefront of "community
prosecution."' 00 Although listening to community groups was a major
component of our agenda, we were not above massaging public
perception of the community. For example, "Richard" was an AfricanAmerican retiree who could be counted on to vocalize a predictably propolice stance at critical city council hearings and other decisionmaking
sessions. Preparing for such meetings always involved a phone call to
Richard to ensure his participation. We respected Richard for his views
and his activism, but we appreciated the political reality that his voice
would go further with a city council struggling to gauge the desires of
inner-city residents than the voices of white liberals opposing police
measures.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the term "community" has been
called "imprecise"' 01 and potentially "idealized."' 1 2 The political
popularity of community-oriented programs already provides a
convenient rhetoric 0 3 that could potentially mask aggressive police
initiatives that run counter to the concept at the heart of true community
policing-improved relations between the police and the rest of the
community. A suburban police chief once confided in me that he was
willing to go along with some forms of community policing in light of
its popularity and the availability of grant funding for community100. See Thompson, supra note 15, at 365 n.171 (touting Portland's Neighborhood District
Attorney program as one of three "excellent community prosecution efforts that have benefited from
self-reflection, and from evaluation and adjustment"); see also Boland (Portland), supra note 15, at
253-77 (discussing Portland's Neighborhood District Attorney program); Boland (NIJ), supranote
15, at 35-40 (same).
101. JEROME E. MCELROY ET AL., COMMUNITY POLICING: THE CPOP IN NEW YORK 3-4 (1993).
102. Livingston, supra note 6, at 577.
103. Academics have warned "that a bewildering and sometimes inappropriate variety of police
initiatives could well be implemented in community policing's name." Livingston, supra note 6, at
578 (collecting cites); see also Law and Disorder: Is Effective Law Enforcement Inconsistent with
Good Police-Community Relations?, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 363, 366 (2000) (comments of Paul
Chevigny) ("So-called community policing that does not mean participation by the people isn't
really community policing."); Robert Weisberg, Foreword:A New Agenda for Criminal Procedure,
2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 367, 370 (1999) (noting that a "somewhat sentimental notion of
'community' norms masks a dangerously majoritarian anti-Constitutionalism").
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oriented programs,' 0 4 but that his version of community policing simply
meant that "we police the community."
The problem opposing an initiative labeled as community-oriented, of
course, is, as Professor Schragger has stated, "No one can be against
community."' 0 5 George W. Bush, for example, has come under fire for
proposing drastic cuts to the budget of the office of Community Oriented
Policing Services (COPS), the federal program developed under
President Clinton to promote community-oriented policing. 0 6 Rather
than terminate the program entirely, Bush's 2004 request retains the
program in name only with a proposal to reduce spending from $1.4
billion in 2003 to $164 million in 2004.107 Even before the budget-cut
proposal, the administration had shifted the focus of the program toward
the provision of technological assistance to local police departments and
placing officers in public schools, nevertheless retaining the communityoriented label. 0 8 In light of the current potential for the community
policing trend to amount at least in some programs to politically popular
rhetoric,' 0 9 scholars should be reluctant to permit constitutional
principles to turn on the supposed involvement and support of the
''community."

104. The availability of federal grant money for projects considered to be community-based
provides an incentive for cities to engage in creative labeling of programs. Heymann notes that
Chicago and New York City adopted markedly different approaches, but both call them
"community policing," a label that Heymann notes is often required in order to obtain federal grant
money that is ultimately used to increase the number of officers within the department. Heymann,
supra note 8, at 422.
105. Schragger, supra note 8, at 403.
106. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL
YEAR
2004
app.
at
643
(Apr.
8,
2003),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/pdf/appendix.pdf
107. See Herbert Lowe, NY Dems Say U.S. Cuts May Cost City 2,000 Cops; Ending Hiring
ProgramIs Wrong in Era of Threats, Trio Argues, NEWSDAY, June 10, 2002, at A13.
108. See Gest, supra note 10, at 762 (discussing the direction of COPS under the Bush
administration).
109. Professors Alschuler and Schulhofer have warned about the need "to be on guard against the
appealing but highly manipulable rhetoric of 'community,' a rhetoric that is increasingly prevalent
in contemporary discourse." Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, AntiquatedProcedures
or Bedrock Rights?: A Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215, 216
(1998); see also supra notes 100-08 and accompanying text (discussing potential of community
rhetoric to mask more traditional, and even aggressive, forms of policing).
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B.

Determining ConstitutionalParametersby Community Sentiment

Even if there were general consensuses within communities about
policing efforts, and even if those consensuses were accurately
measured, a second problem with the new discretion scholarship is its
assumption that communities should be permitted to determine their own
minimum protections from government intrusion. There are two
problems with this assumption. First, it can be difficult to determine
whether the articulated consensus of the community truly reflects the
desires of the residents. Second, even if a community's true desire is to
submit to a particular police practice as an alternative to systemic
neighborhood crime problems, the Constitution should provide
minimum protections that cannot be waived by the political process.
1.

Assessing Community Supportfor the New Policing

As an initial matter, claims that inner-city communities favor the new
policing models should be viewed cautiously, especially in light of the
limited alternatives for which those communities may feasibly opt."0
Programs seemingly supported by an inner-city community may very
well be viewed by the community as the lesser of policy evils in a world
where politically feasible alternatives are limited by the broader
majority."' Kahan and Meares, for example, observe that AfricanAmericans favor order-maintenance policing because it is less harmful
than other forms of law enforcement, such as long prison sentences for
drug offenders." 2 Even if their claim is empirically correct, inner-city
communities do not-even with the increased political power that Kahan
and Meares attribute to them-have the ability to shape the governance
of their communities as they might truly see fit.
Rather, their options-at least those that are realistically obtainableare limited by the broader majority whose values shape the quality of
public schools, banks' lending policies, the availability of job training,

110. Some have questioned the support for new policing models in inner-city communities, even
as a choice among limited and unfavorable options. See Alschuler & Schulhofer, supranote 109, at
217-20.
111. Of course, even if the new discretion scholars are correct in their assertion that AfricanAmericans are better represented in the political process than they were a few decades ago, they still
remain a minority in the vast majority of political districts.
112. Kahan & Meares, supra note 39, at 1165. Cole has criticized Kahan and Meares for failing
to provide any empirical support for their assertion that African-Americans favor order-maintenance
policing. See Cole, supranote 39, at 1085 & n.142.
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and the general economic composition of inner-city neighborhoods. The
new policing models might give the community increased participation
within the narrow sphere of law enforcement, where discretionary
responses to low-level disorder might be preferred over draconian
responses to more serious offenses. However, the community's true
desire might be the less realistic alternative of diverting money from law
3
enforcement in order to improve educational and job opportunities." 1
Moreover, by the time a public safety concept emerges as a concrete
policy proposal, it can be difficult to determine whether individual
community groups played a critical role in the development of the
proposal. Consider, for example, Chicago's anti-gang loitering
ordinance. Although inner-city residents may have been responsible for
identifying the mitigation of gang activity as a city priority, it is at best
unclear whether the community actually gave birth to the anti-gang
loitering ordinance as a response to their concerns. Aischuler and
Schulhofer maintain that the ordinance was drafted by a white alderman
with cooperation from a predominantly white neighborhood association
and the city's attorneys."14 Kahan and Meares, on the other hand,
maintain that minority residents not only provided the impetus for the
ordinance, but also played a critical role in drafting it." 15 In short, it is
unclear whether residents viewed the anti-gang loitering ordinance as an
ideal solution or whether they supported it only after it was drafted as an
6
alternative to crime in their neighborhoods." 1
As a community prosecutor, I played my role several times in the
familiar process of proposing a new initiative. Generally, residents
would identify their problems, then community police and prosecutors
would devise a potential solution, using the community's complaints
about the status quo as political support for the proposal. Invariably,
residents would prefer something else, usually expensive, infeasible
solutions like deterrence through round-the-clock police presence.
Community support for the only proposed alternative to a crime-ridden
113. See Cole, supra note 39, at 1088 (observing that inner-city residents might prefer expensive
alternatives that the larger community is unwilling to pay for); Erik G. Luna, The Models of
Criminal Procedure, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 389, 453 (1999) (maintaining that "[i]nner-city
minorities have opted for discretionary policing techniques not on the merits but because society at
large refuses to provide adequate resources to safeguard urban communities").
114. Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 109, at 217-18 (describing the evolution of the Chicago
ordinance).
115. Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Black, White and Gray: A Reply to Alschuler and

Schulhofer, 1998 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 245, 246-51 (1998).
116. Id.
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neighborhood does not necessarily amount either to full community
support or to full community participation in the decisionmaking
process.
Furthermore, it is less than obvious that residents fully understand
what they are getting when they sign on to support police programs. For
example, African-American communities might support curfews and
anti-gang loitering ordinances, believing that these laws provide a
method to intervene in their youths' criminality before it becomes more
serious." 7 However, because few lay people are well-versed in the often
counter-intuitive parameters of criminal procedure, residents may not
understand that enforcement of low-level criminal prohibitions against
quality of life offenses can lead to the very type of traditional law
enforcement that they disfavor. Increased police-citizen interactions on
the street lead to more frisks," 8 which may reveal drugs or weapons that
trigger lengthy prison sentences. Similarly, a custodial arrest, even for
the most trivial offense, triggers the broad power to search incident to
arrest.11 9 Finally, even if a low-level misdemeanor arrest does not lead to
prosecution for a more serious offense, rampant arrests and convictions
within a community are stigmatizing 20 and2 can undermine the
community's long-term relationship with police.' '
117. Kahan & Meares, supra note 39, at 1169.
118. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21-27 (1968) (authorizing police to stop individuals based on
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is afoot and to frisk stopped individuals
for weapons based on reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and presently dangerous).
119. The lawful custodial arrest of an individual authorizes police to search the person and any
area within her immediate control. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (delineating
the spatial scope of the search incident to arrest exception to the probable cause and warrant
requirements of the Fourth Amendment). When an individual is arrested from a vehicle, the
vehicle's passenger compartment is considered within the arrested individual's immediate control
and therefore can be searched pursuant to the search incident to arrest power. See New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (providing a bright-line rule that the passenger compartment of a
vehicle falls within the scope of a search incident to arrest of one of the vehicle's passengers). The
search incident to arrest authority applies even if the police cannot articulate probable cause, or even
reasonable suspicion, to believe that the arrested person is carrying a weapon, contraband, or items
of evidentiary value. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding that the
search incident to arrest power applies automatically upon arrest). Moreover, police can initiate
custodial arrests for the most minor criminal offenses, even those that do not trigger a potential
sentence of imprisonment upon conviction. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354
(2001) (holding that custodial arrest for failure to use a seatbelt did not violate the Fourth
Amendment).
120. Critics of order-maintenance policing have argued that widespread enforcement of low-level
prohibitions stigmatizes those targeted by the crackdown on disorder, who are frequently minorities.
Accordingly, the policing efforts may contribute to stereotypes of criminality within the
communities affected by order-maintenance policing and may hinder attempts to establish non-
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Moreover, community sentiment can be molded. As a Neighborhood
District Attorney in Portland, I frequently "sold" proposed programs to
both the communities who would be subject to them and the police
officers who would implement them. It was not unusual to use different
talking points for the two audiences.122 For example, selling the
enforcement of a local curfew ordinance to community groups would
generally entail an emphasis on protecting children. It was better for a
minor to be removed from the streets by police, we said, than by a
dangerous predator. We also emphasized the strong likelihood that
police would contact the juvenile's parents to retrieve their child from
the police department before the child would be transported to the
juvenile detention center. Seeking the community's support in advance
was critical, in our view, not so much to shape the end-product
substantively, but for strategic purposes. Community cooperation
legitimized the ultimate proposal and could prevent a political
confrontation down the road with23interested parties who felt excluded
from the decisionmaking process.
Selling police officers on the concept of curfew enforcement entailed
a strikingly different rhetoric. Rather than emphasizing the benefits that
inured to children, we stressed the ability of police to use their discretion
to take custody of a child at night based merely upon the child's
presence in a public place. 124 To police, curfew enforcement was an

criminal social norms. See, e.g., HARCOURT, supra note 29, at 166-79; Fagan & Davies, supra note
19, at 497-500.
121. David Cole makes a similar point. He argues that constitutional doctrines that permit police
to exercise their discretion along race and class lines undermine the legitimacy of law enforcement
among minorities and the poor, and reinforce distrust of and opposition to police and the laws they
enforce. Cole, supra note 39, at 1091.
122. Thacher recognizes the disparity in values between the police and community groups, but
sees order-maintenance policing as providing a "unifying metaphor." See Thacher, supra note 8, at
778-79. In Thacher's view, the broken windows theory bridges the gap between traditional police
priorities and the community's values by linking the targeting of low-level offenses to the police's
underlying goal of reducing serious crime. Id. This is not the same, however, as the police sharing
the community's values themselves. Enforcing misdemeanor laws as a means of revealing more
serious crimes is different than caring about the misdemeanor violations in their own right.
123. See Leena Kurki, Restorative and Community Justice in the United States, 27 CRIME &
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 235, 246 (2000) (attributing popularity of community policing in
part to the "politics of legitimacy").
124. Others have noted the traditional law enforcement priorities that make it possible to "sell"
the new policing models to police officers by emphasizing the potential to discover more serious
crimes. Thacher, for example, reports that many officers support order-maintenance policing
because offenders stopped for minor offenses might turn out to have drugs, illegal weapons, or
outstanding warrants. Thacher, supra note 8, at 778-80 (noting that the broken windows metaphor
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opportunity to search and seize local youths whom police continually
suspected of residential burglaries and drug crimes, even if the police
lacked probable cause to do so. 1 25 Because the message behind the new

policing programs
communities may
understanding every
under current Fourth
2.

can be spun as necessary to gamer support,
support new policing programs without fully
aspect of them, including their
larger implications
126
Amendment jurisprudence.

Permitting Communities To Waive ConstitutionalProtections

Perhaps more'importantly, even if the majority of citizens truly desire
to subject themselves to intrusive government programs to protect their
security, the federal Constitution should provide at least some limitation
on their ability to bind the entire citizenry through the political
process.127 The aftermath of September 11 demonstrates the difficulties
of preserving the value of abstract constitutional liberties in the face of
immediate fears about individual and collective security. In the first
months following the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon,
public sentiment was high that individual rights should defer to the
government's war on terrorism; however, as time passes, the public's
concern about civil liberties has increased, even as the country remains
concerned about "homeland security. 1 28 Although judicial scrutiny of
is used to "win over an entire organization to a concern for disorder").
125. The role that pretextual stops and arrests play in order-maintenance policing cannot be
overlooked. The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that a seizure or search is lawful as long as
there is an objective basis to support it, even though the individual police officer initiating the
seizure or search used that objective basis as a pretext to mask a subjective purpose for which he
lacked lawful justification. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-19 (1996). As lawmakers
authorize police to arrest for offenses further attenuated from immediate harms, there is an increased
likelihood that police will invoke this authority to justify a search of the person on the chance that
they will discover evidence of a more serious offense.
126. For a more thorough discussion of the "value conflicts" between police and the groups and
individuals with whom they "partner" in community policing enterprises, see Thacher, supra note 8,
at 766-71. 1 raise that issue here for the more limited purpose of establishing that the community
and police may support a particular program for different reasons, and that the program may not
always serve the community's values to the extent that the community is led to believe.
127. Luna, supra note 113, at 452 (criticizing Kahan and Meares's political process model for
turning individual rights over to the political majority).
128. For example, in January 2002, three months after the attacks in Manhattan and at the
Pentagon, 47% of Americans said that the government should take steps to prevent terrorism, even
if those steps required violations of basic civil liberties. Joan Biskupic, Attention Turns Back to
Liberty, USA TODAY, Nov. 1, 2002, at 17A (summarizing data from USA Today/CNN/Gallup
polling conducted in January and September of 2002). By September 2002, only one-third of
Americans expressed that view. Id.
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government action can take into account the extent of the need for the
action, 129 the governing constitutional first principles should not depend
on the public's current perception of the need to place security over
13
traditional concepts of individual liberty. 0
In that context, consider Kahan and Meares's argument that inner-city
residents' support for the new policing measures "reflects their judgment
that in today's political and social context, the continued victimization of
minorities at hands of criminals poses a much more significant threat to
the well-being of minorities than does the risk of arbitrary mistreatment
at the hands of the police." 13' To advocate that the judic iary defer to that
judgment is no different than arguing, post-September 11, for judicial
deference to the broader majority's desire to place homeland security
over civil liberties.
Just as many Americans have been willing to exchange civil liberties
for a chance at increased security, at least some inner-city communities
have been long willing to make that same trade at the neighborhood
level. As Maya Angelou has said about the day that is thought to have
changed the way Americans think about their security, 132 "Living in a
129. Current constitutional jurisprudence makes room for the judiciary to evaluate the need for
the challenged government conduct. For example, the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment does not apply if the police act under exigent circumstances presented by the risk of
destruction of evidence, the escape of a suspect, or danger to the public. See Warden, Md.
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (holding that police were entitled to enter the
suspect's home without a warrant because they entered in hot pursuit of the fleeing suspect).
Moreover, several rule-based exceptions to the probable cause and warrant requirements are
grounded in the legitimate needs of law enforcement. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,
234-35 (1973) (grounding the search incident to arrest power upon the exigencies that apply in an
arrest situation); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-27 (1968) (approving minimally intrusive stops and
frisks based on mere reasonable suspicion in light of the needs of patrol officers on the street);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154-56 (1925) (permitting searches of automobiles based on
probable cause but without a warrant in light of the need to prevent the automobile from leaving the
scene before the search is conducted). The Court's "special needs" doctrine also leaves room to
consider the need for warrantless searches. See infra note 354 and accompanying text for an
overview of the special needs doctrine.
130. William Stuntz, however, has argued that the scope of constitutional rights should be-and
is-responsive to changes in the public's prioritization of crime concerns, and he has suggested
ways in which the events of September 11 may affect criminal procedural rules. See Stuntz, supra
note 85, at 2144-90. However, Stuntz appears to refer to the law reflecting broad social changes,
not the particular desires of an individual neighborhood or even short-lived changes in the priorities
of the collective citizenry. See, e.g., id. at 2155-57 (discussing the tendency of courts to be
influenced by large social trends over time and suggesting that September 11, even though only a
one-day salient event, may influence judicial decisionmaking because of its indication of an
ongoing threat).
131. Kahan & Meares, supranote 39, at 1166.
132. September 11, 2001, is widely seen as the first day since Pearl Harbor that Americans felt
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state of terror was new to many white people in America, but black
people have been living in a state of terror in this country for more than
400 years.' 33 In light of the widespread desire after September 11 to set
aside civil liberties so that we can all "feel safe again,"' 134 it should come
as no surprise that African-American communities in inner-city
neighborhoods-"terrorized" regularly by random street robberies,
drive-by shootings, and drug- and gang-related violence-were willing
to make that compromise long ago. If the new discretion scholarship
entrusts African-American communities to strike that compromise
through local political processes, it presumably would permit the broader
majority to set aside traditional liberties in favor of homeland security.
C.

PoliticalProcess:An InadequateSafeguard

Another flaw in the new discretion scholarship is its reliance on the
political process to ensure constitutional rights. Although AfricanAmericans have more political power and representation than they did
during the Warren Court years, they still do not have the same
representation as white voters.135 Indeed, the disproportionate
representation of African-Americans at every phase of the criminal
justice process indicates that the increased political power of AfricanAmericans has not been sufficient to eradicate the36adverse impact of law
enforcement on African-American communities.1

vulnerable. See, e.g., Kenneth Chang & Andrew Pollack, On Many Fronts, Experts Plan for the
Unthinkable: Biowarfare, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2001, at Fl (stating that it was not until September
II that "it collectively occurred to Americans how vulnerable they were"); Julia Keller, The
Doctor-As in Kissinger-Is Still In, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 19, 2001, at C1 (quoting Henry Kissinger as
stating that September 11 brought "a change in the consciousness of people" because "the sense of
vulnerability is now a fact" instead of "something you never used to think about").
133. Gary Younge, No Surrender, THE GUARDIAN, May 25, 2002, at 16 (quoting Maya
Angelou); see also Robert T. Starks, The Black Man Speaks of Terror, N'DIGO 8 (Nov. 1-7, 2001)
(lamenting the suppression of African-American voices in discussions related to September II and
noting the terror known by African-Americans).
134. Biskupic, supra note 128, at 17A ("Rattled by the Sept. II terrorist attacks, Americans
rallied around the flag and accepted the idea that the government needed to take extraordinary
measures to make people feel safe again."); David Winston, It's a Show of Strength, Not a Political
Ploy, THE WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2002, at BI (noting that, in light of September 11,Americans
support military action against Iraq because "[t]hey want to feel safe again").
135. Cole, supra note 39, at 1080-81. Moreover, because of Kahan and Meares's emphasis on the
black-white dichotomy, it is unclear how their model would apply to neighborhoods with significant
percentages of recent immigrants, who do not have the kind of political power that Kahan and
Meares ascribe to African-Americans.
136. For a powerful critique of the new discretion scholars for failing to consider the adverse
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Moreover, even if one were confident that African-Americans had
adequate access to and opportunities within the political process, the
new discretion scholarship incorrectly assumes that the only role of
constitutional law in the criminal justice system is to ensure that police
practices apply across the governed equally. Some constitutional
guarantees protect the individual only comparatively, but others protect
citizens absolutely. This contrast is most familiar in the context of the
Fourteenth Amendment, where the equal protection clause is concerned
only with disparities in a state's treatment of similarly situated
individuals, whereas the due process clause provides certain absolute
protections to the individual from the state. 137
A similar distinction can be drawn between constitutional rights
afforded to criminal suspects. Some rights of criminal procedure are
only comparative. For example, a state need not provide any appeal at all
to criminal defendants; if, however, a state does create appellate
procedures, it cannot arbitrarily deny those procedures to indigents while
affording them to the affluent. 38 "The question is not one of absolutes,
but one of degrees.' 3 9
However, most rights of criminal procedure are absolute, not merely
comparative. States could not, for example, evenhandedly prohibit all
suspects from having counsel during custodial interrogation, because the
40
Fifth Amendment's right to counsel is absolute, not comparative.
Similarly, in drafting the Fourth Amendment, the Framers did not create
"a novel 'evenhandedness' requirement;"' 4' rather, they generally
limited the government's ability to engage in searches and seizures

impact of law enforcement on African-Americans, see Cole, supra note 39, at 1074-79.
137. See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974) ("'Due process' emphasizes fairness
between the State and the individual dealing with the State, regardless of how other individuals in
the same situation may be treated. 'Equal protection,' on the other hand, emphasizes disparity in
treatment by a State between classes of individuals whose situations are arguably
indistinguishable.").
138. Id. at 606-07. Applying that rule, the Court has held that an indigent defendant has a right to
appointed counsel for any first appeal of right created by the state, but does not have such a right for
discretionary appeals. Id. at 616-18 (refusing to extend right to counsel on first appeals of right to
discretionary appeals); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (holding that states must
provide counsel to indigents for first appeals of right).
139. Ross, 417 U.S. at 612.
140. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471-73 (1966) (holding that states cannot use statements
obtained during custodial interrogation unless defendant is first advised of and waives the right to
remain silent and to have counsel present).
141. Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 670 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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absent probable cause and a warrant.142 If the only purpose of the Fourth
Amendment were to invalidate discriminatory searches and seizures,
then communities could vote to allow suspicionless home searches to
find evidence of criminal activity, as long as the police searched all
homes and not just some.143 Although a political process approach is
useful in applying comparative rights, 144 the separate rules of criminal
procedure do more than protect against discrimination. In short, if the
political process were sufficient to constrain governmental conduct,
courts would not regularly interpret the federal Constitution to limit
governmental conduct.
D.

The Virtues of Vagueness Review

Another flaw in the new discretion scholarship is its seeming
indifference to the virtue of notice protected by the void for vagueness
142. For example, one of the few areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence where the evenhandedness of a search can substitute for the usual requirement of probable cause is the "special
needs" doctrine, where a search advances some governmental concern other than ordinary law
enforcement. See infra note 354 and accompanying text for an overview of the special needs
doctrine. Even in that limited context, the notion that government intrusions are acceptable as long
as they are not discriminatory has faced resistance. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 668-76 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing majority's reliance upon evenhandedness in upholding random drug-testing
of school athletes, where the Court found a "special need" justifying a departure from the usual
probable cause and warrant requirements); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 664 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (dissenting from majority's holding that police officer's discretionary
stop of driver was unlawful and suggestion of nondiscretionary roadblocks as a solution, and noting
that the majority had "elevate[d] the adage 'misery loves company' to a novel role in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence").
143. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45-47 (2000) (striking down drug
interdiction checkpoint, even though it was administered evenhandedly, because it did not fall
within the "special needs" exception to usual Fourth Amendment requirements); Vernonia, 515 U.S.
at 673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that, despite the majority's emphasis on evenhandedness in
the special needs context for suspicionless searches, "it remains the law that the police cannot, say,
subject to drug testing every person entering or leaving a certain drug-ridden neighborhood in order
to find evidence of crime").
144. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 88-101 (1980). Professor Ely's

political process theory, founded largely upon Justice Stone's famous footnote in Carolene
Products, calls for the protection of procedural rather than substantive rights in order to avoid the
judiciary's imposition of its own value judgments on society. See Luna, supra note 113, at 443
(discussing Ely's theory); see also Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 812
(1999) (describing Kahan and Meares's theory as "neo-political process theory of criminal
procedure"). According to Professor Ely, the Court should remain uninvolved, in Fourteenth
Amendment terms, unless and until (1) the powerful impede access to the "channels of political
change" or (2) laws are enacted that systematically disadvantage a discrete and insular minority.
ELY, supra,at 103; Luna, supra note 113, at 443-44.
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doctrine. Vague laws do not provide notice of what should be a clear
boundary between criminal and non-criminal activity. By requiring
substantive criminal law to be specific, the void for vagueness doctrine
attempts to ensure that citizens do not offend criminal prohibitions
without at least the ability to know in advance the scope of the criminal
law. 145 Requiring criminal laws to be specific also limits law
enforcement's ability to interpret vague laws in 1a46 manner to justify the
arrest of anyone police might arbitrarily identify.
The new discretion scholars dispute the virtues of the void for
vagueness doctrine by emphasizing the discretion that police retain even
when they enforce specific laws. For example, Livingston notes that
legislators forced to articulate specific standards tend to articulate rulebased prohibitions rather than standard-based norms. 147 Rules attempt to
articulate prohibited conduct with particularity, while standards
articulate the policies and goals underlying the law. 148 Livingston notes
that because rule-based prohibitions are imperfect reflections of the
underlying standard, they can be both overbroad and underbroad. 149 As
an example, Livingston cites laws that attempt to curtail youths from
automobile "cruising" by prohibiting driving past a traffic control point
145. See supra Part L.B for a discussion of the void for vagueness doctrine. Of course, criminal
law does not require actual knowledge by an individual defendant that his conduct violated the law;
it requires only that criminal laws provide fair notice to individuals about their scope. Compare
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (providing that criminal laws must
require notice), with Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (stating the general rule that
"ignorance of the law will not excuse") (internal quotations and citation omitted). Rather than
contradict one another, these two well-accepted criminal law principles work hand in hand. Because
criminal laws are required to be "definite and knowable," one can argue that there is no true
reasonable ignorance of the criminal law. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW
165-66 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing mistake of law claims); see also United States v. Baker, 807 F.2d
427, 430 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that "a defendant could be convicted without any knowledge
whatsoever of the law making his conduct criminal").
146. See supra Part L.B (discussing anti-vagueness doctrine's role in limiting arbitrary police
discretion).
147. Livingston, supra note 6, at 610-18.
148. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557 (1992) (offering an economic analysis to the question of whether laws should be promulgated as
rules or as standards); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword. The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22, 57 (1992) (describing "the rules and standards debate in a nutshell"). Sullivan
summarizes the debate succinctly. "A [law] is standard-like when it tends to collapse
decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact
situation." Sullivan, supra, at 58. "A [law] is rule-like when it binds a decisionmaker to respond in a
determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts." ld. For example, a posted speed limit
is a rule, while a prohibition against careless driving is a standard.
149. Livingston, supra note 6, at 614.
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in a designated area during specified night hours or more than a
specified number of times within a fixed period.150 While such laws
effectively limit police discretion by specifically defining the prohibited
conduct, the statutes' reach is not limited to those against whom
enforcement of the legislation was intended.' 51 When such laws are
argues, police will use their discretion to decide
overbroad, Livingston
152
it.
enforce
to
not
Similarly, Kahan and Meares maintain that judicial invalidation of
vague ordinances actually forces communities to tolerate police
strategies that involve even more discretion. They point out, for
example, that Chicago could substitute its gang-loitering efforts with
New York City's zero-tolerance approach, where public order laws are
specifically defined, but where police officers retain wide discretion
about where, when, and whether to enforce them. 153 The void for
vagueness 54doctrine places no restraint, they note, on this type of
discretion. 1
In other words, the new discretion scholars equate officers' discretion
to choose whom to arrest among those who are arrestable under a
specific law with the discretion to decide who is arrestable under a vague
law. Such a comparison overlooks a critical distinction between the
discretion to be lenient and the discretion to sanction. When criminal
laws are specific, police undoubtedly retain discretion to reduce criminal
liability by opting not to enforce the law where it applies. This form of
police discretion is similar to the discretion that other participants in the
criminal justice system exercise. For example, prosecutors have
discretion not to file the most serious criminal charges that might apply
to a given defendant and to pursue a less serious charge instead or not to
file any charges at all, but they do not have the discretion to file a charge
for which there is no probable cause. 55 Similarly, upon conviction,
150. Id. at 616.

151. Id. at 616-18.
152. Id.
153. Kahan & Meares, supra note 39, at 1170.
154. Id.; see also Heymann, supra note 8, at 442-43 (noting that the denial of discretion is "a
fiction" because police exercise discretion in determining whether to enforce criminal laws);
Livingston, supra note 6, at 615 (noting that police officers can enforce specifically defined
prohibitions in discriminatory ways).
155. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Prosecution andRace: The Powerand Privilege of Discretion, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 21-24 (1998) (discussing broad authority granted to prosecutors in their
charging decisions); Robert L. Misner, Recasting ProsecutorialDiscretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 717, 743-50 (1996) (same).
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judges exercise discretion to sentence the defendant within the
applicable sentencing range, but do not have the discretion to go beyond
the maximum sentence. 56 To permit vague criminal laws, in contrast,
would permit not just police but also prosecutors and judges to select
whom to punish because a non-specific law could be interpreted at any
stage in the criminal justice system to encompass the entire population.
The distinction between discretion to sanction and discretion to show
leniency is a meaningful one, despite its formality. Whereas the former
creates the potential to sweep unwitting actors within the scope of a
criminal law defined vaguely, the latter involves discretion only over
those who step first across the criminal law's clearly defined borders.
The importance of this difference can be seen in the U.S. Supreme
Court's recent sentencing jurisprudence. The Court has held that while a
trial court judge can determine sentencing factors by a preponderance of
the evidence, the elements of the substantive criminal offense must be
pled in the indictment and proven to the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.'57
In Apprendi v. New Jersey,'58 the Court held that any fact, other than
perhaps recidivism, 159 that increases what would otherwise be the
applicable maximum sentence must be treated as an element of the
offense and be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 60 In
156. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481-83 (2000).
157. See id. at 474-97. Apprendi and its progeny are based on the longstanding rule that due
process requires the prosecution to prove each element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970). Prior to Apprendi, the Court had suggested
that state legislatures could avoid Winship by labeling relevant factors as sentencing factors rather
than as elements of the offense. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228-47
(1998) (upholding federal unlawful reentry statute, under which the maximum sentence increased if
the judge found that the defendant's prior deportation was for an aggravated felony, because this
recidivism finding was a sentencing factor and not an element of the offense); McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 84-93 (1986) (upholding statute specifying a mandatory minimum
sentence if the trial judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant "visibly
possessed a firearm" during the offense, because the factor was not an element of the offense under
Winship). After an initial hint that Winship was not so easily avoided, see Jones v. United States,
526 U.S. 227, 243 (1999), the Court in Apprendi held that the government must plead and prove to
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt any factor that increases what would otherwise be the applicable
maximum sentence. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
158. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
159. The Court left open the possibility that the legislature could assign factual findings regarding
recidivism to be determined by the trial court by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than by the
jury by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 496. This qualification permitted the Court to
reconcile its holding with Almendarez-Torres. Id.; see Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 228-47
(holding that recidivism was a sentencing factor, not an element of the offense).
160. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
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contrast, as long as the fact does not result in a sentence beyond the
maximum penalty provided for the offense of conviction, the legislature
can specify the fact as a sentencing factor to be determined by the trial
court by a mere preponderance of the evidence.' 61 The Apprendi regime
has been criticized for creating "a meaningless and formalistic
difference."'' 62 For example, while Apprendi prohibits using a so-called
"sentencing factor" to increase the defendant's sentence beyond the
otherwise applicable statutory maximum, it permits the legislature to
establish a very high statutory maximum-triggered by the jury's
finding of guilt on the substantive offense-and then to establish
"sentencing factors" that govern the judge's determination of the actual
sentence beneath the statutory maximum.' 63 This criticism echoes the
new discretion scholars' sentiment about the distinction between vague
and specific laws: that legislatures can avoid the void for vagueness
doctrine and yet continue to vest discretion in police by establishing
clear, broadly defined prohibitions, and then permitting the police to
exercise discretion in determining when, where, and against whom to
enforce the law.
Although the distinction between authority to be lenient and authority
to sanction is a formalistic one, recognizing the distinction preserves the
important virtue of notice to the citizenry about potential criminal
penalties. As Justice Scalia has written in the sentencing context, it is
"not unfair to tell a prospective felon that if he commits his
161. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 556-69 (2002) (upholding against an Apprendi
challenge a statute specifying a mandatory minimum sentence that was shorter than the maximum
allowable sentence and triggered by a trial court's finding by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant brandished a firearm); McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89-91 (upholding statute specifying a
mandatory minimum sentence if the trial judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" during the offense).
162. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 541 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that the Constitution should not
"require a state legislature to follow such a meaningless and formalistic difference in drafting its
criminal statutes"); see Harris, 536 U.S. at 569 (Breyer, J., concurring) (concurring in Court's
holding that Apprendi does not apply to mandatory minimums, but stating that he "cannot easily
distinguish" the statute struck down in Apprendi from a mandatory minimum sentencing statute and
"cannot agree with the plurality's opinion insofar as it finds such a distinction").
163. Justice O'Connor has demonstrated the ease with which legislatures can avoid Apprendi
problems. For example, in Apprendi, the Court held that New Jersey could not extend the maximum
sentence of a felony from ten years to twenty based on a judicial finding that the defendant was
motivated to intimidate the victim based on race. 530 U.S. at 494-97. However, as Justice
O'Connor points out, New Jersey could cure its sentencing scheme by establishing twenty years as
the maximum sentence for the underlying felony and then using the defendant's motivation as a
sentencing factor to establish the actual sentence imposed within the theoretical sentencing range.
Id. at 540 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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contemplated crime he is exposing himself to a jail sentence of 30
years-and that if, upon conviction, he gets anything less than that he
may thank the mercy of a tenderhearted judge."' 64 Although such a
regime might lead to disparities, "the criminal will never
get more
165
punishment than he bargained for when he did the crime."
Notice of substantive criminal prohibitions is even more important
than notice of the applicable potential penalties. Just as the Apprendi
doctrine requires legislatures to be clear when defining factors that affect
the extent of liability, the void for vagueness doctrine requires
legislatures to be clear when defining the underlying substantive
criminal prohibitions. And just as Apprendi can be avoided by inflating
maximum sentences, anti-vagueness prohibitions can be avoided by
defining substantive prohibitions broadly but clearly.' 66 However, a
legislature that avoids either Apprendi or the void for vagueness doctrine
by manipulating the doctrines' formalities is more accountable
politically than an unrestricted legislature. For example, if legislators
avoid Apprendi by inflating all statutory maximum sentences beyond
reason, it is more likely that they will be held accountable politically67
than if inflated sentences are imposed only at the courtroom level.
Similarly, if the legislature avoids the void for vagueness doctrine by
clearly but overbroadly defining the scope of substantive criminal
prohibitions, their decision to do so at least has the potential to trigger
political debate. 68 In contrast, permitting vague criminal laws invites
little political oversight because members of the citizenry will tend to

164. Id. at 498 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (noting that defendant similarly "may thank the mercy of a
tenderhearted parole commission if he is let out inordinately early, or the mercy of a tenderhearted
governor if his sentence is commuted").
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the new discretion
scholars' perspective that police continue to exercise discretion even when legislatures avoid the
anti-vagueness doctrine.
167. Justice Stevens, in defending the majority's opinion in Apprendi, noted that "structural
democratic constraints exist to discourage legislatures" from exposing all defendants convicted of
any given offense "to a maximum sentence exceeding that which is, in the legislature's judgment,
generally proportional to the crime." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 n.16. From this perspective, the
Apprendi doctrine enhances transparency by requiring politically accountable legislatures to expose
their sentencing priorities through statutory maximum sentences. "So exposed, '[t]he political check
on potentially harsh legislative action is then more likely to operate."' Id. at 491 n.16 (quoting
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 228-29 n. 13 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
16". Professor Sunstein has made the point before that invalidation of vague criminal laws can
enhance democracy by forcing legislatures to be clear. Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword-Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 25 (1996).
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read vague criminal laws as applying only to what they think of as
criminal behavior, and therefore, as not applying to them or to people
like them. 169 Consider, for example, the considerable political debate
that surrounds proposed laws to prohibit smoking in public places.
Those laws are controversial because they clearly criminalize conduct
that many citizens consider to be innocent. If, in contrast, the proposals
were worded as prohibitions against "offensive" conduct, smokers might
be unlikely to read the proposed ban as applying to them, at least until
the statute was actually enforced in a way that was considered
objectionable. By equating the discretion not to enforce specific laws
with the discretion to choose whom to punish under a vague law, the
new discretion scholars undervalue the role that political oversight can
play as a check on legislative decisionmaking, even as they tout the
power of the political process.
E.

Elasticity of the New DiscretionAlternatives

Finally, in addition to the theoretical problems posed by the new
discretion scholarship, the alternative decisionmaking models suggested
by the new discretion scholars provide little predictive value in
application. Although some new discretion scholars concede that
application of their proposed alternatives "could result in legitimate
differences of opinion at the margins,"'7 the reality is that the models
can be manipulated to justify upholding just about any police conduct.
One problem in applying the new discretion scholarship is in defining
the relevant community, the starting point to determining whether the
"community" has burdened itself evenhandedly. Richard Schragger has
discussed the tendency of the new policing models to use the term
"community" in a way that masks contradictory notions of what

169. Like the void for vagueness doctrine, the well-established rule of lenity reflects the
importance of legislative accountability. By mandating strict construction of ambiguous criminal
statutes, the rule of lenity attempts to ensure that legislatures, not the judiciary, define criminal
prohibitions. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (explaining important functions
served by the rule of lenity). Kahan has observed that the rule in practice departs from its theory. He
argues that courts have been "sporadic and unpredictable" in the application of lenity principles out
of recognition that legislatures operate more effectively if permitted to delegate lawmaking at the
interstices to the judiciary. See Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP.
CT. REV. 345,346-54.

170. See Livingston, supra note 6, at 647 (acknowledging that it may be difficult to determine
whether a law is targeted at "outsiders," but stating that other constitutional standards require
similar judgments).
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community means.' 7' He summarizes three accounts of community:
contractarian, deep, and dualist. 72 Under a "contractarian" account, a
community is defined by its members' agreement to join the
community.' 73 Chess clubs and housing associations are communities
from this perspective because members can withdraw from the group if
they disagree. A "deep" account of community suggests that community
identity is imposed, not chosen.' 74 On this account, community inures
from a sense of connectivity and reciprocity inherent in human social
relationships. 175 Meares, for example, discusses a sense of "linked fate"
shared among all humanity, but particularly by African-Americans,
176
whose life circumstances have been shaped historically by race.
Finally, Schragger develops a "dualist" model of community that
emphasizes both the intentionality and connectivity of group identity.
This account of community emphasizes not who is involved in a
decision, but the quality of the decisionmaking process. Under the
dualist model, community involves grassroots participation by
individuals in small, local settings, where decisions are the results not of
a fair majority vote,77 but of "true conversations" where each
"stakeholder" is heard. 1
The new policing models, in contrast, tend to emphasize geographic
boundaries when defining community, 17 8 an identity that may not
correlate with any meaningful sense of "community." 179 Because of exit
171. Schragger, supra note 8, at 387-403.
172. Id.
173. Id.
at 387-93.
174. Id.
at 393-97.
175. Id.
176. As Meares explains the concept of "linked fate," it has two aspects: one that exists generally
among all humanity, and one that describes African-Americans specifically. All people have a bond
with family and friends and tend to consider the effect of government policies upon them in
formulating their own policy positions. African-Americans, however, share this empathy even with
African-Americans who are strangers, because their life circumstances have been shaped
historically by race. Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 191, 215-17 (1998) (discussing the concept of a "linked fate" among AfricanAmericans); Meares, supra note 91, at 682-83 (same).
177. Schragger, supra note 8, at 398-403.
178. Todd R. Clear & David R. Karp, The Community Justice Movement, in COMMUNITY
JUSTICE: AN EMERGING FIELD, supra note 15, at 3, 15 (noting that community justice approaches
conceptualize community boundaries by neighborhood); Heymann, supra note 8, at 421 (discussing
the new policing approach of concentrating police resources by neighborhood). See generally
Rosen, supra note 78, at 1166-82 (advocating geographic variations in constitutional requirements).
179. See Schragger, supra note 8, at 403-16 (warning that the rhetoric of community can be used
to reinforce geographic and spatial boundaries); see also MCELROY, supra note 101, at 3-4
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costs, residence within an inner-city neighborhood does not indicate a
social contract. Spatially-defined neighborhoods also do not seem to
meet a deep account of community. Although residence might be a
proxy for race and socioeconomic status, a deep account of community
suggests that some neighborhood residents would not share a sufficient
connection to the "community" to speak on its behalf.' 80 From this
perspective, spatial attempts to define community fail to explain which
"communities" trigger social attachments worthy of moral deference,
and which do not.18 1 Similarly, geographic boundaries are inconsistent
with a dualist notion of community because there is no guarantee that an
initiative favored by a spatially-defined neighborhood is the result of a
process in which neighbors spoke to each other locally and openly.
Moreover, even if one accepts the notion of defining the relevant
"community" by residents' addresses, the new discretion scholars have
not articulated a standard to determine the size of the relevant
community. By manipulating the geographic boundaries of the relevant
"community," one can determine whether police action is seen as
1 82
burdening the community as a whole or only targeted outsiders.
Consider, for example, Kahan and Meares's political process theory.
Kahan and Meares maintain that a Chicago Housing Authority policy
authorizing suspicionless searches of units in a public housing project
would pass muster under their political process theory because
representatives of the housing project tenants supported the policy and
("Virtually all commentators agree that the concept of 'community' as used in the rhetoric of
community policing is imprecise ...and largely uninformed by a century of sociological usage and
study."); Carl B. Klockars, The Rhetoric of Community Policing, in COMMUNITY POLICING:
RHETORIC OR REALITY, supra note 9, at 239, 247-50 (noting that genuine communities are rare).
180. Schragger, for example, notes that a white inner-city shopowner losing business because of
minority youths loitering outside would lack a normative claim for redress. See Schragger, supra
note 8, at 433.
181. Rosen, for example, suggests that new policing could be accommodated by creating
geographic nonuniformities in constitutional law, but recognizes that minimal constitutional
safeguards would be imperiled if the "wrong communities" were evaluated with constitutional
nonuniformities. See Rosen, supra note 78, at 1193. However, Rosen does not attempt to articulate
which communities are the "right" ones. He suggests that nonuniformity should be permitted only
for "those communities whose existence or creation is not otherwise incompatible with a wellordered liberal society," but ultimately concludes that the question of which communities warrant
nonuniformity is an "important and relevant" one that "must await another day." Id. at 1193-94.
182. See Kahan & Meares, supranote 39, at 1171-75 (maintaining that courts should defer to the
political process as long as the burden of challenged police procedures falls upon average members
of the community or those who share a "linked fate"); Livingston, supra note 6, at 647 (arguing that
vague public order laws should be tolerated if they "do not appear aimed at the exclusion of groups
or individuals from participation in a community's public life") (emphasis added).
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because the burden of the searches fell "on everyone who lived in the
projects."' 83 Although they concede that some project residents
undoubtedly disapproved of the search policy, they argue that courts
should not second-guess the policy because any dissenting tenants had
the opportunity to participate in the political process, the majority had
the dissenters' interests in mind, 8and
the majority agreed to subject
4
themselves to the searches as well. 1
However, the nature of the "representation" of the public housing
authority tenants in Chicago was unusual and uniquely local in that
tenants were permitted to select representatives from their housing
development to act on a Local Advisory Council. Typically, however,
representation takes a less specific form, and housing project tenants
would be seen as "represented" by the person elected from the district
containing the affected housing project. When one defines the
community more broadly as the entire neighborhood, residents of the
housing projects are among the least powerful in a broader community
that contains businesses, homeowners, and private landlords and tenants.
Seen from this perspective, a public housing search policy does not
burden average members of the community at all; rather, support for the
policy by the "community's" elected officials could be seen as the
majority singling out a powerless minority for intrusive searches for law
enforcement purposes.
A second problem in applying Kahan and Meares's political process
theory is in determining whether the community is burdening itself
evenhandedly. Kahan and Meares would uphold not only those police
practices that apply to all residents of a community equally, but also
those that apply to only a subsegment of the population, as long as the
targeted minority is not "despised."' 8 This particular aspect of their
theory appears especially difficult in application. For example, Kahan
and Meares maintain that juvenile curfews and gang-loitering provisions
would pass their political process theory because inner-city teenagers
and gang members "are linked to the majority by strong social and
familial ties."' 86 In Kahan and Meares's view, inner-city communities
183. Kahan & Meares, supra note 39, at 1175.
184. Id.
185. See id. (arguing that curfews and gang loitering laws would pass the political process test,

"albeit in a less straightforward fashion" than laws that burden the entire community); see also
Livingston, supra note 6, at 647 (arguing that courts should tolerate vagueness in public order laws
if they do not exclude outsiders "from participation in a community's public life").

186. Kahan & Meares, supranote 39, at 1175.
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support public order laws "precisely because they care so deeply1 87about
the welfare" of at-risk youths and share a "linked fate" with them.
However, this argument presumes not only that a majority of innercity residents support such laws, but also that the majority shares a
specific subjective motivation for that support. As an initial matter,
188
Kahan and Meares cite no clear empirical support for their claim.
Moreover, it is unclear how courts can determine whether participants in
the political process are subjectively motivated by feelings of a "linked
fate" or good old-fashioned animus. Even if African-Americans feel a
sense of empathy toward other African-Americans generally, 89 they
may nevertheless disfavor a minority within that larger group. 90 Kahan
and Meares's argument suggests that whenever African-Americans
support police conduct, courts should defer to the political process as
long as the people affected by the conduct are African-American. As
Professor Cole has noted, this approach should presumably allow
communities to single out short or overweight people for loitering
prohibitions (or, as Kahan and Meares concede, gang members or youths
more generally), as long as the broader community shared a "linked
fate" at a more abstract level.' 19
Finally, even if courts could determine as an evidentiary matter the
subjective motivations underlying public support for police conduct,
Kahan and Meares's emphasis on those motivations is inconsistent with
the general notion that the permissibility of police conduct generally
does not turn on subjective motivations. For example, an arrest for a
low-level offense based on probable cause is lawful, even if the arresting
officer had a subjective motive to use the arrest as a pretext to
187. Id. at 1175-76; see also Meares, supra note 176, at 215-17 (discussing the concept of a
"linked fate" among African-Americans); Meares, supra note 91, at 682-83 (same).
188. See Kahan & Meares, supranote 39, at 1165 n.78. To support their notion of a "linked fate"
among African-Americans, Kahan and Meares cite to Meares's prior scholarship and to articles
discussing the interplay between gang members and drug dealers and law-abiding residents in innercities. Id. To say that gang members and drug dealers have law-abiding family members, or that
there are occasions for mutual reliance between law-abiding elements of the community and street
gangs, is not inconsistent with the notion that the majority of the community may single out youths
in an attempt to control crime in their communities.
189. Meares, supra note 176, at 215-17 (discussing the concept of a "linked fate" among
African-Americans); Meares, supra note 91, at 682-83 (same).
190. For example, Suzanne Meiners has explored how community policing programs frequently
target youth. Suzanne Meiners, A Tale of Political Alienation of Our Youth: An Examination of the
Potential Threats on Democracy Posed by Incomplete "Community Policing" Programs, 7 U.C.
DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL'Y 161 (2003).

191. Cole, supra note 39, at 1084.
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investigate a different offense, because there is an objective basis for the
arrest that renders the arrest reasonable.1 92 If suspicious motivations do
not undermine police conduct with an objectively reasonable basis, then
compassionate motivations should not salvage police conduct lacking an
objectively reasonable basis.
III.

THE PROGRAMMATIC PURPOSE APPROACH:
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN PUNITVE AND NONPUNITIVE POLICING

As set forth in the previous Part, new discretion scholars advocate the
new policing by encouraging a retreat from established jurisprudence.
This Part challenges the new discretionists' assumption that current
doctrinal rules necessarily conflict with the new policing models. In
doing so, this Part explores a distinction virtually ignored by current
scholarship between punitive and non-punitive programs within the new
policing models.
A handful of scholars have responded to the new discretion
scholarship by defending current limitations on police discretion.
However, they have done so without entertaining a threshold question of
whether all new policing models necessarily fall within the applicable
scope of the rules that they defend. For example, responding primarily to
Kahan and Meares, Professors Cole, Alschuler, and Schulhofer have
defended the void for vagueness doctrine.1 93 They maintain that Kahan
and Meares overstate both the political power and the support for ordermaintenance policing among African-Americans. 194 They also criticize
the malleability of the Kahan and Meares thesis, questioning whether it
has any limits at all. 95 Cole further attacks the Kahan and Meares
position that freedom from crime is a co-equal component of liberty with
freedom from government intrusion. Cole argues that official
misconduct is a qualitatively-different, more destructive harm192, See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808-19 (1996) (vehicle stop based on police
officers' observation of several traffic offenses was lawful, even if the officers initiated the stop to
facilitate investigation of drug offenses for which they lacked reasonable suspicion or probable
cause).
193. Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 109, at 225-44; Cole, supra note 39, at 1082-90.
194. Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note
195. Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note
say if you hate the sin but love the sinner,
Cole, supra note 39, at 1084 (criticizing
Meares's political process theory).
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109, at 242-43 (wondering if the "next step might be to
you can share her burden") (internal footnote omitted);
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particularly to African-Americans-than harm from private, unofficial
criminal offenders. 96 By arguing to retain vagueness review of criminal
laws without addressing which categories of new policing initiatives
should be subject to such review, Cole, Alschuler, and Schulhofer
appear to assume-at least implicitly-that all new policing initiatives
are punitive.
Other critics of the new policing appear to share this assumption
without squarely entering the debate over the void for vagueness
doctrine. For example, Bernard Harcourt has been critical of the new
policing models, particularly the broken windows theory underlying
them. 197 He argues that the theory lacks empirical support and, in any
event, emphasizes only order-maintenance policing's benefits, without
taking into account the resulting harms. 198 To Harcourt, an accurate costbenefit calculation must also consider the hardship of misdemeanor
arrests on a largely harmless population of arrestees, the increased risks
of police misconduct that accompany increased arrests, the disparate
impact that order-maintenance policing has on racial minorities, and the
delegation of authority to police about whom to arrest.199 Similarly,
Fagan and Davies have compiled statistical evidence indicating that
zero-tolerance policing, at least in New York City, adversely affects
racial minorities. 200 Both Harcourt and Fagan and Davies critique ordermaintenance policing for cracking down on disorder, but neither
distinguishes between punitive and non-punitive responses to disorder.
Viewed as non-criminal programs, much of the new policing might
conform with current constitutional jurisprudence. This Part pursues the
distinction between punitive and non-punitive policing models in four
subparts. Subpart A develops a distinction at a programmatic level
between policies that pursue criminal law's traditional objectives of
retribution and deterrence through punishment, and those that pursue
non-punitive objectives. Although existing criminal procedural rules
should not apply to many of the policies implemented under the new

196. Cole, supra note 39, at 1089-90.
197. HARCOURT, supra note 29, at 90-104.
198. Id. at 213.
199. See id. at 57-89, 212-14; Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 154-61 (discussing order-maintenance policing); see also Thacher,
supra note 8, at 770 (agreeing with Harcourt that the potential "side effects" of new policing
models, such as distortion of ideals about appropriate law enforcement, must be taken into account

when determining their efficacy).
200. Fagan & Davies, supranote 19, at 475-96.
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policing models, the level of scrutiny should be determined by
examining the programmatic purpose of the policy, not by manipulating
the rhetoric of community.
To develop further the distinction between punitive and non-punitive
programs, Subpart B examines neighborhood exclusion ordinances as an
example, incorporating existing jurisprudence regarding police conduct
that advances a "special need" and the developing jurisprudence
defining the heart of criminal punishment. Subpart C then reexamines
Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance as a non-punitive response to
gang activity. Finally, Subpart D discusses the advantages of the
programmatic purpose model over the current new discretion
scholarship.
A.

Abandoning Rhetoric and Developing Meaningful Distinctions

At least implicit in the new discretion scholarship is the assumption
that existing constitutional jurisprudence governing criminal law and
procedure must be changed before cities can take full advantage of the
promise of the new policing models. Examination of the programs
approved by the new discretion scholars, however, reveals that at least
some of these programs fall well outside of any traditional notion of the
criminal justice system and should therefore be free from scrutiny under
the jurisprudence that the new discretion scholars seek to overhaul.
Responding effectively to the low-level, frequent occurrences that
trouble neighborhood residents often involves creating long-term,
preventative solutions rather than responding to individual crimes after
the fact through arrest and prosecution. Other new policing initiatives,
however, clearly implicate the traditional constitutional concerns raised
by citizen-police encounters, despite the "community policing" labels.
The current academic literature regarding the new policing models fails
to explore the fuzzy middle between these two extremes, focusing
entirely on the rhetoric of "community" policing and ignoring an
important distinction between punitive and non-punitive initiatives in the
new policing models.
Consider, for example, police collaboration with community groups
to pick up garbage, paint over gang graffiti, or plant flowers. 20 1 These
201. See, e.g., Waldeck, supra note 13, at 1271-77 (discussing New York City Transit
Authority's Clean Car Program, involving immediate removal of graffiti from subway trains, and
contrasting it with the New York Police Department's zero-tolerance approach). Neal Katyal has
called attention to the potential of architecture as instrumental in crime control, an approach that
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efforts are made under the new policing approach, are favored by the
new discretion scholars, and clearly do not raise constitutional questions
under existing jurisprudence. In contrast, some new policing techniques
simply resort to the traditional law enforcement model, with a shifted
emphasis on low-level, quality of life offenses. For example, New York

City's zero-tolerance campaign devoted street-level policing efforts to
the enforcement of low-level criminal prohibitions such as turnstile
jumping, aggressive panhandling, and squeegeeing windows.20 2 Other
than the emphasis on low-level offenses, zero-tolerance policing mirrors
rapid-response policing: officers become aware of an offense, arrest an
individual offender, and refer the case for prosecution on criminal
20 3

charges.
New policing efforts can fall somewhere between the extremes of
flower planting and zero tolerance. Consider, for example, a hypothetical
noise ordinance that, instead of criminalizing unreasonable noise,
authorizes police to seize any devices used to make unreasonable noise
pending an administrative hearing to determine whether the devices

should be returned. 20 4 Unlike community clean-up and flower planting,
this hypothetical ordinance responds to an individual problem directly.
The ordinance would give police leverage to negotiate compliance with
norms at the street level; indeed, even a resistant noise-maker who is
unwilling to negotiate could ultimately be silenced through seizure.
However, unlike traditional criminal law, the ordinance does not seek to

deter future noise violations by convicting and punishing the offender.
presents few constitutional concerns. Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, Ill YALE
L.J. 1039passim (2002).
202. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 28, at 174-75 (describing New York Police Department's zerotolerance approach).
203. See, e.g., Fagan & Davies, supra note 19, at 471 (noting that the focus of New York City's
policing approach was controlling disorder, and "the tactic to achieve it was arrest, the most
traditional of law enforcement tools"); Greene, supra note 28, at 175 (noting that New York City's
zero-tolerance approach is "grounded in traditional law enforcement methods and in relentless
crackdown campaigns to arrest and jail low-level drug offenders and other petty perpetrators").
204. Ordinances resembling this hypothetical are not uncommon. In Chicago, police are
authorized to impound any vehicle used to violate the city's sound device restrictions. If a hearings
officer determines that there is probable cause that the vehicle was used to violate the restrictions,
the vehicle is not returned until the owner pays a cash bond of $500 plus towing fees. CHI., ILL.,
MUNICIPAL CODE § 11-4-1115 (2002). It is increasingly common for cities to authorize police to
impound devices used to make excessive noise, primarily vehicles containing booming stereos, as
evidence of an unreasonable noise violation. See, e.g., SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE
§ 59.5.0502(b)(3) (2000) (authorizing those who enforce the prohibition against unreasonable noise
to seize as evidence any component transmitting or amplifying the noise and authorizing police to
impound vehicles containing such a component if the component cannot readily be removed).
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Accordingly, constitutional rules that govern criminal law and procedure
are arguably inapplicable.
Implicit in the new discretion scholarship is the assumption that any
law giving authority to police should be analyzed as a criminal statute.
For example, Livingston recognizes that the community clean-up aspect
of the new policing approaches does not implicate any constitutional
concerns. 20 However, she appears to assume that if police go beyond
these types of clean-up efforts and attempt to enforce norms of
orderliness, their conduct necessarily presents legal problems under
current jurisprudence.2 °6
Rather than focus on the unique programmatic purposes often (but not
always) pursued by the new policing approaches, the new discretion
scholars have attempted to mark these approaches as unique by
emphasizing the role of the community. To some extent, it is not
surprising that the early scholarship in this area has fallen into this trap,
as the police approaches themselves are cloaked in community rhetoric
and do not expressly highlight their non-traditional operational
mechanisms. A more meaningful basis upon which to distinguish much
(but not all) of the new policing from traditional criminal law is its
underlying programmatic purpose of solving public safety problems
other than through the traditional mechanism of deterring and punishing
through arrests, convictions, and criminal sentences.
B.

Drug Free Zones: An Example

If the hypothetical noise ordinance above demonstrates the possibility
of using non-punitive ordinances to solve criminal law problems, actual
ordinances across the country show just how far this approach can be
taken. This subpart explores neighborhood exclusion under "drug free
zone" ordinances as an example of how cities can gain control over the
use of public spaces without resorting to criminal punishment.
The neighborhood exclusion concept originated in Portland, Oregon,
with the enactment of a city ordinance designating discrete geographical
areas as "drug free zones" based on their high incident rates of drug
205. One of Livingston's examples of the new policing involved police officers working with
other municipal agencies to improve the physical deterioration of housing projects by removing
trash and abandoned cars from the neighborhood, an effort that was followed by a notable decrease
in residential burglaries. Livingston, supra note 6, at 575. This clearly does not raise any criminal

procedural questions, just as new policing efforts avoid any legal questions when they eradicate
graffiti by painting over it instead of attempting to catch suspects with paint cans in hand. Id. at 584.
206. Id. at 584-85.
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crimes.20 7 If a person is arrested for committing a drug crime in a public
area of a drug free zone, police exclude the individual from the zone for
ninety days. 2 0 8 Entry into a drug free zone in violation of an exclusion
order constitutes criminal trespass, a misdemeanor defined by the state
penal code.20 9 The exclusion orders are effective automatically 210 unless
the excluded individual invokes one of two important procedural
protections. First, the individual has the right to file an administrative
appeal to challenge the basis for the exclusion.21' Once the appeal is
filed, the exclusion is stayed while the appeal is pending.2 12
Second, even if the excluded individual does not challenge the basis
for the exclusion itself, he may seek a variance from the police to enter
the zone for a broad variety of purposes.2 13 Variances can be granted if
the individual lives, works, goes to school, or needs access to social
services or "essential needs" within the zone. 2 14 Additionally, the
ordinance authorizes "general" variances that may be issued for "any
reason" to "an excluded person who presents a plausible need to engage
in any non-criminal activity." 215 The ability to obtain a variance is so
broad, in fact, that the ordinance arguably acts more like a targeted
loitering ordinance than an exclusion ordinance. In other words, the
practical effect of a neighborhood exclusion order is not an absolute
prohibition against the individual entering the zone, but a restriction on

207. PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE §§ 14B.20.010-.070 (2002). The City Council determines the
drug free zone designations based on the number of drug arrests made in an area in the previous
twelve months, revisiting the zone designations every few years. Id. §§ 14B.20.010-.020; see State
v. James, 978 P.2d 415 (Or. Ct. App. 1999). Portland also has a prostitution free zone ordinance that
enables police to exclude individuals from high-vice neighborhoods. PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE
§§ 14B.30.010-.070.
208. PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE § 14B.20.030(A). The ordinance does not apply if the drug

offense is committed within a private residence. Id. If the actor is eventually convicted of the crime
for which he is arrested, he is issued a separate exclusion of one-year duration. Id. § 14B.20.030(B).
209. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 164.245 (2001) (defining criminal trespass in the second degree
as entering or remaining unlawfully in or upon premises); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2
(1985) (prohibiting criminal trespass).
210. PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE § 14B.20.060(A)(6) (providing that if excluded individual does
not file a notice of appeal, the exclusion takes effect on the eighth day following the initial notice of
exclusion).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. § 14B.20.060(B).
214. Id.
215. Id.
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his ability to move within the zone without an articulated purpose
approved in advance by police.21 6
Unlike Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance, drug free zone
ordinances have not been the subject of considerable academic
commentary. 2 17 In lower courts, opponents of neighborhood exclusion
ordinances have had limited success arguing that exclusion orders
constitute punishment. 218 However, the argument that neighborhood
exclusion constitutes punishment appears to assume that any impairment
of an individual's status quo constitutes punishment, an assumption
clearly at odds with current law.
After a brief flirtation with aggressive judicial scrutiny of supposedly
civil legislation,21 9 the U.S. Supreme Court made clear in Hudson v.
United States220 that whether a penalty constitutes criminal punishment
216. Andrew Leipold has suggested that one cure for loitering ordinances is to target only those
who have already broken the law. Andrew D. Leipold, Targeted Loitering Laws, 3 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 474, 483 (2001). In some respects, Portland's drug free zone ordinance conforms to Leipold's
model by excluding those who have been arrested for a drug-related offense, but then permitting
excluded individuals to obtain variances permitting them to move within the zone, but only for
specified purposes.
217. But see Schragger, supra note 8, at 408 n.131 (citing Cincinnati's drug exclusion zone
ordinance as an example of a law that essentially zones a targeted geographic area as drug free);
Kim Strosnider, Anti-Gang Ordinances After City of Chicago v. Morales: The Intersection of Race,
Vagueness Doctrine, and Equal Protection in the Criminal Law, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 101, 129
(2002) (primarily discussing anti-gang loitering ordinances, but citing Cincinnati's drug free zone
ordinance as demonstrating "the lengths to which cities will go in order to carve out zones where
different-and more restrictive-laws apply to combat perceived crime problems").
218. The issue of whether neighborhood exclusion constitutes punishment has been litigated in
the double jeopardy context, with excluded individuals arguing that they may either be excluded
from a neighborhood or prosecuted criminally for the underlying conduct, but not both. One federal
district court agreed with opponents of neighborhood exclusion ordinances that neighborhood
exclusion constitutes criminal punishment, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
decision on separate grounds. See Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 119 F. Supp. 2d 735, 747-49 (S.D.
Ohio 2000) (holding that neighborhood exclusion ordinance violated defendant's right to be free
from double jeopardy by allowing him to be convicted of the underlying drug offense and to be
excluded from neighborhood), aff'd on other grounds, 310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
123 S. Ct. 2276 (2003). In contrast, Oregon's courts have held that neighborhood exclusion does not
constitute criminal punishment. State v. Lhasawa, 55 P.3d 477, 561 (Or. 2002) (concluding that
neighborhood exclusion is a civil sanction that does not implicate double jeopardy concerns); State
v. James, 978 P.2d 415, 417-21 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (same).
219. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446-52 (1989) (holding that supposedly civil
penalties for false Medicare reimbursement claims consituted punishment because they were not
related to the actual damages from the fraud); United States v. Ursey, 518 U.S. 267, 283-92 (1996)
(refusing to apply Halper analysis to in rem civil forfeitures). The Court has expressly abandoned
Halper as being too quick to label a penalty as criminal punishment. Hudson v. United States, 522
U.S. 93, 100-03 (1997).
220. 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
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is a matter of statutory construction requiring a two-part inquiry. 22' The

first question is whether the legislature enacting the penalty expressly
labeled it as civil or criminal.222 Second, even if the penalty is designated
as civil, the court must ask whether the penalty is so punitive in either its
purpose or effect as to transform what was purportedly intended as a

civil penalty into a criminal one.223 Seven factors, originally set forth by
the Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,224 serve as guideposts for
answering the second question.225 These factors ask whether the scheme

is in response to criminal conduct, requires scienter, imposes an
affirmative restraint, promotes the traditional aims of criminal
punishment, is rationally connected to a non-punitive purpose, has

historically been regarded
as punishment, or is excessive in relation to its
226
supposed civil purpose.

Municipalities enacting drug free zone ordinances have designated
neighborhood exclusion as a civil penalty.227 Accordingly, the relevant
inquiry under Hudson is whether, in light of the seven MendozaMartinez factors, exclusion is so harsh in purpose or effect as to reveal a
contrary nature.228 Two of the seven factors do suggest punishment.

9

Exclusion orders are issued in response to conduct constituting a crime,
such as drug possession. 230 These crimes, in turn, require proof of at
least some mens rea.

221. Id. at 99.
222. Id. ("A court must first ask whether the legislature, 'in establishing the penalizing
mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other."')
(quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980)).
223. Id.
224. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
225. Id. at 168-69.
226. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 1149 (noting the relevance of the seven
Mendoza-Martinez factors), reh 'g denied, 123 S. Ct. 1925 (2003); Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99 (same);
Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 (same).
227. PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE § 14B.20.030 (2002) (entitled "Civil Exclusion"); State v.
James, 978 P.2d 415, 419 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) ("It is undisputed that [the exclusion provisions] were
expressly designated as civil.").
228. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99.
229. James, 978 P.2d at 420 (concluding that the Hudson factors of scienter and whether conduct
constitutes a crime supported the defendant's argument that exclusion constituted criminal
punishment).
230. See PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE § 14B.20.030(A) (setting forth the drug crimes that trigger
neighborhood exclusion under Portland's drug free zone ordinance). Under the prostitution-free
zone ordinance, neighborhood exclusions are issued based on an arrest for prostitution-related
offenses. See id. §§ 14B.30.010-.070.
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However, such suggestion of punishment is not necessarily
dispositive in the case of neighborhood exclusion orders. As an initial
matter, future ordinances employing the neighborhood exclusion concept
could be drafted to trigger police authority in response to conduct that
does not constitute a crime and does not require proof of a culpable
mental state. More importantly, under Hudson, no one factor is
determinative-all must be given consideration. 231 As demonstrated
below, the five remaining Mendoza-Martinez factors all suggest that
neighborhood exclusion does not constitute punishment.
1. No Affirmative Restraint
First, neighborhood exclusion is not an "affirmative restraint" under
the Court's apparent conception of that term. 32 Unfortunately, the Court
has given little guidance about what constitutes an "affirmative
restraint," suggesting obliquely that the term as "normally understood"
provides sufficient clarity.233 The Court has indicated that the definition
of affirmative restraint might be extremely narrow, including only those
sanctions
that
approach the
"'infamous
punishment'
of
imprisonment. 2 34 The Court has held, for example, that the civil
commitment of sexual offenders constitutes an affirmative restraint,235
23 1. Under the U.S. Supreme Court's current jurisprudence, the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors
are guideposts; no single factor is determinative. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101 (rejecting Halper
analysis in part because it rendered one of several relevant factors dispositive).
232. But see James, 978 P.2d at 419 (concluding with little analysis that a drug free zone
exclusion was an affirmative restraint because it limited an individual's freedom to enter a specific
area).
233. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104 (noting that money penalties and occupational disbarment did "not
involve an 'affirmative disability or restraint,' as that term is normally understood").
234. Id. (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)); see also State v. Lhasawa, 55
P.3d 477, 486 (Or. 2002) (noting that recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions "appear to suggest that
nothing short of imprisonment would qualify as an affirmative disability or restraint"). In holding
that a prohibition against participation in the banking industry did not constitute an affirmative
restraint, the Court in Hudson simply noted that the petitioners' sanction was "certainly nothing
approaching the infamous punishment of imprisonment" and did not constitute an affirmative
restraint "as that term is normally understood." Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104 (internal citations and
quotations omitted). The Court has not made clear whether "affirmative restraints" encompass only
those things that approach imprisonment, or whether the concept of an affirmative restraint as
"normally understood" is broader. At least one circuit court has adopted the former, narrow notion
of affirmative restraint, asking only whether the sanction approaches imprisonment. See Cutshall v.
Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 474 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that the question of whether something is an
affirmative restraint or disability depends on whether the sanction approaches imprisonment).
235. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360-69 (1997) (holding that, although civil commitment
of sexual offenders who were rendered incurably dangerous by mental disorder constituted an
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236
but that mandatory registration as a sexual offender does not.
Exclusion from a discrete geographic area within a city does not involve
237
imprisonment.
Some of the Court's decisions, however, suggest that a sanction short
of literal confinement can constitute an affirmative restraint. Most
recently, the Court explained that the appropriate inquiry asks "how the
effects of the ...[scheme] are felt by those subject to it. If the disability
or restraint is minor and indirect, its effects are unlikely to be
punitive., 238 Applying that test, the Court concluded that the mail-in
registration required by Alaska's sex offender registration and
notification scheme did not impose an affirmative restraint, but appeared
to entertain the notion that an in-person registration requirement might
be considered an affirmative restraint. 9
Even if there is room within the affirmative restraint concept for
sanctions other than confinement, it clearly does not encompass every
sanction that restricts the activities of an individual. 240 For example, in

affirmative restraint, it did not constitute criminal punishment that implicated the double jeopardy
clause).
236. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 1151-54 (upholding Megan's Law against an ex
post facto challenge and holding that registration and notification scheme did not impose an
affirmative restraint), reh"g denied, 123 S.Ct. 1925 (2003).
237. Cf.Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363 (holding that civil commitment, although not necessarily
punishment, is an affirmative restraint); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987)
(discussing pretrial incarceration).
238. Smith, 123 S.Ct. at 1151.
239. Id.; see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (concluding that
deportation of draft evaders amounted to punishment, without determining whether it constituted an
affirmative restraint).
240. Even courts using a notion of affirmative restraint that goes beyond literal confinement have
conceded that sanctions of limited scope do not constitute affirmative restraints under current
punishment jurisprudence. For example, in an opinion ultimately reversed by the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Ninth Circuit created a circuit court split by using a broad notion of affirmative restraint
(and also of punishment) to strike down as double punishment Alaska's program for registering
convicted sex offenders and notifying communities regarding their presence. Doe I v. Otte, 259 F.3d
979, 983-95 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd sub nom. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S. Ct. 1140, reh'g
denied, 123 S.Ct. 1925 (2003). Despite the broad standards for punishment applied in Doe I, even
the Doe I court conceded that a more limited sanction would not constitute punishment. Id. at 98889. In striking down the Alaska program, the Court distinguished the program from a less onerous
program previously upheld as neither an affirmative restraint nor punishment. Id. at 987. While the
prior program required only a one-time registration, the Alaska program required multiple
registrations per year for the offender's lifetime as well as community notification. Id. These more
onerous requirements went beyond the "limited" scope of the previously upheld program and
rendered the program, in the Ninth Circuit's view, an affirmative restraint. Id. But see Burr v.
Snider, 234 F.3d 1052, 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (upholding as reasonable state court's decision that sex
offender registration and notification requirements were not affirmative restraints or punishment);
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Hudson, the Court held that lifetime disbarment from the banking
24
industry was neither an affirmative restraint nor criminal punishment. '
Like disbarment from a profession, a neighborhood exclusion requires
the affected individual to refrain from specified conduct, but does not
require the individual to engage in any affirmative conduct. The impact
of exclusion might be harsh in some cases. However, the impact is no
less onerous than barring an individual from participating in what had
been his lifetime career, a prohibition that was upheld in Hudson as
neither an affirmative restraint nor criminal punishment. 242
In fact, neighborhood exclusion orders are arguably a narrower
limitation on an individual's status quo than a lifetime prohibition
against working in one's trained profession. Current neighborhood
exclusion ordinances authorize exclusion from only discrete geographic
areas within the city, comprising only a small percentage of their
respective metropolitan areas.243 The exclusions are also for a limited
duration. 24424 5 Moreover, the ordinances authorize the issuance of
variances.

Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1250 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that sex offender registration and
community notification program was neither an affirmative restraint nor punishment); Cutshall v.
Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 474-77 (6th Cir. 1999) (same).
241. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 103-04 (1997).
242. Id. at 103-05; see also Brewer v. Kimel, 256 F.3d 222, 228 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting harsh
effect of prohibiting individual from lifetime career in Hudson, and holding by comparison that
revocation of driver's license was not an affirmative restraint or punishment). But see Johnson v.
City of Cincinnati, 119 F. Supp. 2d 735, 748 (S.D. Ohio 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 310 F.3d
484 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2276 (2003). In Johnson, a federal district court held
that neighborhood exclusion amounted to an affirmative restraint simply because "[i]t is a restraint
against the liberty of those arrested or convicted for the drug-abuse crimes." Id. This reasoning is
wholly inconsistent with Hudson's express recognition that a restriction might be burdensome and
yet nevertheless constitute neither an affirmative restraint nor criminal punishment. See Hudson,
522 U.S. at 99 (noting that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit multiple civil
punishments).
243. See PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE § 14B.20.070 (2002) (defining boundaries of Portland's
drug free zones).
244. The ordinances usually authorize exclusion for ninety days, and none of the ordinances
authorizes exclusion for more than a year. See ID. § 14B.20.030 (defining duration of Portland's
drug free zone exclusion orders); Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 487-88 (6th Cir.
2002) (describing duration of exclusion under Cincinnati's drug free zone ordinance), cert. denied,
123 S. Ct. 2276 (2003).
245. PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE § 14B.20.060(B) (describing procedures to obtain variances
under Portland's drug free zone ordinance); Johnson, 310 F.3d at 488 (describing procedures to
obtain variances under Cincinnati's drug free zone ordinance).
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2.

Not the TraditionalAims of Punishment

Secondly, under Mendoza-Martinez, neighborhood exclusion zones
do not promote the "traditional aims of punishment." When properly
understood, neighborhood exclusion ordinances do not promote
retribution and deterrence, at least not in the manner in which criminal
punishment traditionally does. Rather, as explained further in this
Subpart, neighborhood exclusion seeks to protect a targeted geographic
area from future prohibited conduct by civilly restraining and
redistributing past offenders.
As an initial matter, it is worth noting that the role of police officers
in issuing exclusion orders and variances does not itself render the
orders criminal punishment. 246 Moreover, although police officers issue
the exclusion orders and variances under drug free zone ordinances, all
appeals are handled as administrative hearings outside of the police
department and criminal courts.247
The scope of neighborhood exclusion orders suggests that they are not
intended as retribution. Under any retributive notion of punishment, the
duration or geographic scope of the exclusion would be linked to the
severity of the wrongfulness of the excluded actor's underlying
conduct.2 48 One would also expect exclusion orders designed to extract
retribution to prohibit the wrongful actor from entering his own
neighborhood, so that the punishment in each case would deprive the
offender of his own community. Moreover, a retributive exclusion
presumably would not permit variances for individuals who lived within
the community. In contrast, civil neighborhood exclusion orders are
identical, regardless of the severity of the underlying criminal offense;
246. Cf New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 717-18 (1987) (holding that inspection by police
officers of automobile junkyard premises should be evaluated by standards applicable to
administrative searches, and not as a traditional search for criminal evidence, even though the
administrative process was implemented by law enforcement officers).
247. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 103 (holding that Congress's decision to vest disbarment authority

in administrative agencies suggested that Congress intended disbarment as a civil sanction, not a
criminal one).
248. Traditional criminal law achieves retribution by punishing past wrongs. See generally
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (John Ladd trans., 1965); MICHAEL
S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 233-37 (1984); MICHAEL S.
MOORE, PLACING BLAME (1997); David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1623 (1992); Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659 (1992); H.J. McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian Approach To
Punishment, 8 INQUIRY 249 (1965); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Retributivism, Moral Education, and the
Liberal State, 4 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 3-11 (1985).
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apply only to pre-designated high-crime zones, regardless of the
offender's residence; and permit variances to accommodate offenders
who live within those zones.
Although neighborhood exclusion orders are not intended as
retribution, they certainly are intended to reduce criminal activity within
the zones, a purpose that falls within any broad conception of
deterrence. 249 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that
both civil and criminal penalties can have deterrence goals. 250 For
example, sexual offender registration and notification requirements are
undoubtedly intended to deter future crimes; nevertheless, 25
the1 Court has
'
punishment
criminal
impose
not
do
schemes
such
held that
25 2
In State v. James,
the Oregon Court of Appeals held that
neighborhood exclusions did not promote the aims of traditional
criminal punishment. Although the James court reached the right result,
it did so with flawed reasoning. The court reasoned that the deterrent
goals of neighborhood exclusions were civil rather than criminal,
because the city's ultimate legislative concerns were not about drug
activity per se, but rather about the collateral consequences of that
activity on neighborhood property values, business activity, and general
quality of life.253
By looking at the legislative concerns motivating the imposed
penalties, rather than the nature of the penalties themselves, the court
made it too easy for lawmakers to evade criminal procedural rules by
doctoring their legislative history. If what matters are the goals of
legislators (regardless of the penalty they design to reach those goals),
any penalty will fall on the civil side of this Hudson factor as long as
lawmakers avoid tough-on-crime rhetoric in their legislative history and

249. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 145, at 15 (discussing deterrence).
250. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 1152 ("Any number of governmental programs
might deter crime without imposing punishment."), reh g denied, 123 S. Ct. 1925 (2003); Hudson,
522 U.S. at 105 (noting that a civil penalty's deterrent goals do not render the sanction criminal, "as
deterrence 'may serve civil as well as criminal goals') (quoting United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S.
267, 292 (1996)).
251. Smith, 123 S. Ct. at 1152 (upholding retroactive enforcement of Megan's Law against an ex
post facto challenge and noting that "[t]o hold that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders
such sanctions criminal ... would severely undermine the Government's ability to engage in
effective regulation") (internal citations and quotations omitted).
252. 978 P.2d 415 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
253. Id. at 420.
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speak instead of broader concerns that are traditionally the aims of civil
law.254
The U.S. Supreme Court has already made clear in a separate context
that the rules of criminal procedure are not so easily avoided. In
2 55 the Court addressed the constitutionality of
Ferguson v. Charleston,
testing pregnant women for drugs at public hospitals. The ultimate
purpose behind the drug testing program was to reduce the number of
drug-influenced babies by using the threat, of criminal prosecution to
persuade drug-addicted pregnant women to obtain substance abuse
treatment.25 6 The government argued that this ultimate goal was a special
need beyond traditional law enforcement, and, therefore, pregnant
women could be tested without a warrant or probable cause.257
Nevertheless, the Court held that the drug testing program violated the
Fourth Amendment.258 In doing so, the Court rejected the government's
special needs analysis by scrutinizing the program's actual content,
rather than its ultimate goal. When viewed for its "programmatic
purpose" rather than its ultimate objectives, the drug testing program
operated by generating evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution.
That the ultimate objective revealed a kinder, gentler form of law
enforcement was insufficient to demonstrate a special need for Fourth

254. Existing neighborhood exclusion ordinances contain such language within the introductory
subsections, typically with a statement from the city council that the higher incidences of criminal
activity within the designated zones are deteriorating the quality of life in those neighborhoods. See,
e.g., Cincinnati, Ohio, Ordinance 229-1996 (Sept. 6, 1996) (city council finding that the city "has a
substantial and compelling interest in restoring the quality of life and protecting the health, safety,
and welfare of citizens using the public ways in [the zones]"); Portland, Or., Ordinance 170913
(Feb. 12, 1997) (city council finding that drug activity within zones "contribute[d] to the
degradation of these areas and adversely affectfed] the overall quality of life for the areas' residents,
businesses and visitors").
255. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
256. Id. at 82-83 (noting that "the ultimate goal of the program may well have been to get the
women in question into substance abuse treatment and off of drugs").
257. Id. at 73, 81. In a series of cases, the Court has upheld warrantless, suspicionless searches
justified by a "special need" beyond ordinary criminal law. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 838 (2002) (upholding as reasonable drug testing of students involved in extracurricular
activities); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) (upholding as reasonable drug
testing of school athletes); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989)
(upholding as reasonable drug testing program for certain employees of United States Customs
Service); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633-34 (1989) (upholding as
reasonable a drug testing program for railway employees involved in train accidents); . cf Chandler
v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322-23 (1997) (striking down as unreasonable program requiring drug
testing of candidates for state elected office).
258. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81-84.
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Amendment purposes, "[b]ecause law enforcement involvement always
serves some broader social purpose or objective. 2 59
3.

Connection To Civil Purposes

Although the James court applied a test that makes avoidance of
criminal procedural requirements too easy, it reached, I believe, the
correct result. Stated in Mendoza-Martinez terms, neighborhood
exclusions are civil in nature not because they are motivated by a civil
purpose, but because of the way in which they connect to that civil
purpose. 260 In other words, what matters most is not that neighborhood
exclusion ordinances seek to improve neighborhood quality of life, but
that they do so through a remedial penalty rather than through traditional
criminal punishment.
As an initial matter, the nature of the restraint is similar to a civil
restraining order. For example, assault victims routinely obtain
restraining orders preventing their assailants from coming within a
certain distance of them, and this does not constitute criminal
punishment. 26' These orders can restrain respondents from contacting
not just the immediate victims of assaults, but related individuals, and
262
they often require respondents to move from their homes.
Nevertheless, they are seen as civil restraints.263 Drug free zone
exclusions are an extension of the restraining order concept, treating the
neighborhood as the victim of the individual's drug activity.
A second way of understanding neighborhood exclusion as a civil
remedy, despite its deterrent purpose, requires an understanding of the

259. Id. at 84 (emphasis added).
260. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (holding that whether a
sanction has an assignable non-criminal purpose is one of seven factors in determining whether
sanction is punitive in nature).
261. See Peter Finn, Statutory Authority in the Use and Enforcement of Civil Protection Orders
Against Domestic Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 43, 44 (1989) (noting that double jeopardy does not prohibit

a subsequent prosecution for the same act for which a family abuse civil protection order is issued);
Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An
Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 801, 1122 (1993) (same).
262. See Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies To Achieve Criminal Law
Objectives: Understandingand Transcending the Criminal-CivilLaw Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J.

1325, 1406 & n.431 (1991) (noting that almost all domestic abuse civil protection order statutes
permit courts to evict the respondent from his own residence); Klein & Orloff, supra note 261, at
921-22 (noting that civil restraining orders have required respondents to stay away from the
petitioner's residence even when he, rather than the petitioner, was the lawful owner).
263. Finn, supra note 261, at 44; Klein & Orloff, supranote 261, at 1122.
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theory on which the program is premised. Traditional criminal
punishment (e.g., imprisonment) is thought to deter in two familiar
ways. 264 The goal of specific deterrence is to deter an individual actor's
future misconduct both by incapacitating him and by teaching him that
he will suffer further punishment if he reoffends upon release.2 65 General
deterrence aims to dissuade the general population from engaging in
criminal conduct by notifying the population of the consequences of
such conduct through the punishment of individual actors.266
These traditional means of deterrence play at most a minor role in the
goals of neighborhood exclusion orders. Exclusion from individual
neighborhoods does not prevent the excluded actor from engaging in
criminal conduct outside of the zone. The most that can be said is that
the order aims to prevent the individual from committing offenses within
the zones. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that the prospect of a
short-term order of exclusion significantly tips a would-be offender's
cost-benefit calculation, either at a specific or general level, when the
relevant conduct is already subject to criminal penalties. Finally, even if
neighborhood exclusion orders have some incidental effects that
fines, and
resemble traditional deterrence, the same could be said of civil
267
penalties.
criminal
considered
yet those are not necessarily
Although the goal of neighborhood exclusion orders, like traditional
punishment, is to reduce the number of drug offenses (at least within the
designated zones), they do so in an operational manner that is entirely
different from traditional deterrence functions. When distinguishing
between traditional law enforcement and non-criminal enforcement in
the Fourth Amendment context, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
that civil and criminal law regimes might share the same ultimate
264. A utilitarian theory of punishment assumes that actors commit crimes when it is in their

interest to do so. Accordingly, the optimal punishment is one that is just sufficient to make the
perceived costs of the undesired act outweigh the anticipated advantages of the act, considering for
example the likelihood and likely severity of the punishment. See Steven Kiepper & Daniel Nagin,
The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment Revisited, 27
CRIMINOLOGY 721 (1989). See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1982) (1789); JOHN
STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Longmans, Green, & Co. 1907) (1863); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING &
GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973).
265. See DRESSLER, supra note 145, at 15 (discussing specific deterrence).

266. See id. (discussing general deterrence).
267. For example, one claimed benefit of our compensatory tort law system is to alter the cost-

benefit balance applicable to negligent conduct. When the potential costs of a tort law suit are taken
into account, repairing broken sidewalks and designing goods safely are not just kindhearted acts;
they are rational. Yet, such damages are considered civil, not criminal, in nature.
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purposes, but can nevertheless be distinguished on the basis of their
methodologies. In New York v. Burger,268 for example, the Court upheld
a New York City administrative program that authorized police to
conduct warrantless searches of businesses involved in the dismantling
of automobiles. 269 Although traditional law enforcement searches are
presumed to be unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment
in the absence of probable cause and a warrant, 270 the Court held that
searches pursuant to New York's administrative scheme were reasonable
because they were justified by a "special need" that was separate from
the ordinary needs of traditional law enforcement.271
In doing so, the Court expressly rejected the notion that a government
program's purpose was the sole determinant of whether civil or criminal
procedural rules governed its constitutionality. New York's highest court
had struck down the statute authorizing the searches in part because the
statute targeted criminal activity.272 The Court reversed, noting that a
state can choose to address major social concerns through both
administrative and penal regimes. 273 "Administrative statutes and penal
laws may have the same ultimate purpose of remedying the social
problem, but they have different subsidiary purposes and prescribe
different methods of addressing the problem." 274 New York's
administrative scheme sought to prohibit the sale of stolen vehicle parts
by setting forth how businesses should be operated, while the penal law
emphasized the punishment of individuals for specific criminal acts.
As demonstrated by the contrasting results of Burger and Ferguson,
there is a critical distinction between the government's use of traditional
268. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
269. id. at 702. The statute required businesses involved in dismantling automobiles to maintain
records of all transactions and to permit police to inspect those records and any automobile parts in
the business's possession. Id. at 694 n. 1. The failure to maintain the required records or to cooperate
with a requested inspection was punishable as a misdemeanor. Id.
270. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269-70 (1973) (reiterating
previous holdings that probable cause is the Fourth Amendment's minimum requirement); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (equating the lack of a warrant with unreasonableness);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (discussing the importance of the warrant
requirement).
271. Burger,482 U.S. at 702.
272. See id.at 712 (noting that Court of Appeals struck down the New York statute as violative
of the Fourth Amendment because it "had no truly administrative purpose but was 'designed simply
to give the police an expedient means of enforcing penal sanctions for possession of stolen
property') (quoting New York v. Burger, 493 N.E.2d 926, 929 (N.Y. 1986)).
273. Id.
274. Id.
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criminal law methods to accomplish a non-criminal ultimate objective
(as in Ferguson), and the use of methods outside of the criminal law to
accomplish objectives that are shared by the criminal law (as in Burger).
Just as the administrative regime upheld in Burger shared the same
ultimate objective as criminal sanctions for possession of stolen
property, neighborhood exclusion ordinances share the same ultimate
objective as criminal drug laws.2 75 However, neighborhood exclusion
seeks to prevent drug activity through a method that differs qualitatively
from arrest and prosecution.
Neighborhood exclusion orders are thought to work not because
offenders fear being subject to them, but because they operate to disrupt
a retail market. In order for drug transactions to occur, buyers and sellers
must locate each other. Once a given area is known for drug activity,
individual sellers and buyers know to congregate there to offer and
accept the product. Displacing market participants from known retail
locations is intended to prevent new transactions not by incapacitating
individual participants from attempting to enter into transactions
(traditional deterrence), but by making it difficult for the participants to
locate each other to transact.
Some might argue that neighborhood exclusion orders will simply
276
move the drug market into surrounding neighborhoods, not disrupt it.
However, it seems probable that neighborhood exclusion orders both
disrupt and displace the targeted activities.2 77 The drug trade (like gang
and vice activity) depends on group behavior. As one criminologist has
suggested, drug dealing is most successful when transacted within a
well-known marketplace associated with reliable participants. 27" With
only word of mouth to rely on, participants in the drug trade cannot

275. With respect to prostitution free zones, the ordinances creating the zones share the same
ultimate objective as criminal laws against prostitution.
276. Schragger, for example, argues that the power to zone empowers one neighborhood to
displace unwanted people and activities to surrounding neighborhoods, "a probably limited and

short-lived success." Schragger, supra note 8, at 429.
277. In Portland, for example, drug-related arrests within a defined zone decreased by an average
of thirty-five percent after implementation of the exclusion program. However, on average, drug
arrests in areas surrounding the targeted zone increased twelve percent. Multnomah County
Neighborhood

DA

Unit,

at

http://www2.co.multnomah.or.us/da/NDAP/index.cfm?fuseaction=strategies&menu= 19&title=Drug
%20Free%20Zones%20%28DFZ%29 (last visited Sept. 30, 2003) (on file with author).
278. See John E. Eck, A General Model of the Geography of Illicit Retail Marketplaces, in CRIME
& PLACE 67, 73-77 (John E. Eck & David Weisburd eds., 1995).
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collectively and immediately open shop in any single new location. In
279
the process of relocating, at least some transactions must be lost.

Moreover, even if displacement were the only effect of neighborhood
exclusion ordinances, displacing crime out of high-crime neighborhoods
may be both an effective and normatively appropriate crime-control
strategy. If one believes that low-level crimes reach a "tipping point" at

which they lead to more crime, such offenses may be less detrimental to
a community if maintained beneath a threshold at which they begin to
28 0
deteriorate

community

confidence and

overall

quality

of life.

Furthermore, from a normative perspective, there is utility in sparing a
neighborhood from bearing a disproportionately heavy burden of either a
jurisdiction's crimes 281 or its rigorous police activities. By disbursing a

city's crimes more equitably among neighborhoods, displacement can
prevent relatively sheltered residential pockets from writing off streetlevel crimes as a problem only for the "inner-city." And if policing
efforts must spread into other neighborhoods to follow the crime, that
move

could

repeal

what

Randall

Kennedy

has

called

the

disproportionate "tax" that racial minorities currently pay for our various
282
wars against criminality.
Note that both the "neighborhood victimization" and "market
disruption" arguments, which distinguish neighborhood exclusion orders
from traditional punishment, apply only when the exclusions are limited

to neighborhoods with significant, visible activity. To argue that
exclusion orders are intended to disrupt a market, the city must show the
existence of such a market within the zone. Similarly, it is difficult to
argue that an entire neighborhood is victimized by a single, isolated drug
279. See Leipold, supra note 216, at 497 (arguing that anti-gang loitering laws do more than
move gang activity, at least in the short term, because groups need time to reform and relocate).
280. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the broken windows
theory, which posits that visible disorder can lead to further neighborhood deterioration.
281. There is a stronger normative argument for displacing crime out of high-crime
neighborhoods than out of relatively trouble-free areas. Cf Robert W. Helsley & William C.
Strange, Gated Communities and the Economic Geography of Crime, 46 J. URB. ECON. 80 (1999)
(using an economic model to show that gated communities divert crime to other neighborhoods).
282. See Randall Kennedy, Suspect Policy, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13-20, 1999, at 30, 34
(arguing that the cessation of racial profiling would repeal the "racial character" of the current "tax"
for the wars against illegal immigration and drugs); see also DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE:
RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 54 (1999) (arguing that "well-to-do
white people" would be more likely to pressure police to regulate themselves if they were routinely
subject to police-citizen encounters); Leipold, supra note 216, at 497 (arguing that moving gang
activity from one neighborhood into another "should help spread the cost of law enforcement more
equitably").

1046

Unpacking New Policing

transaction within an otherwise drug-free neighborhood, and it is
therefore difficult to liken members of that neighborhood to the
traditional categories of victims protected by civil restraining orders.283
The broken windows theory posits that low-level disorder, if left
uncorrected, leads to serious crime.284 Whether one believes the link
between disorder and crime is direct 285 or indirect, 286 the disorder must

be visible under the broken windows theory in order to affect the
conduct of either law-abiding members of the community or would-be
troublemakers. Unlike a broken window, isolated drug transactions can
go unnoticed. In order for drug activity to destabilize the community
through either the direct or indirect mechanisms proffered by Wilson and
287
Kelling, the activity would need to reach a critical mass of visibility.
When that point has been reached, neighborhood exclusion for offenders
can be justified as a remedy to the neighborhood. Immediate and
temporary exclusion of former drug market participants prevents
potential future actors from perceiving an ongoing market and believing
that no one in the community cares if further criminal activity occurs
there. Moreover, with drug offenders excluded from the neighborhood,
residents will feel safer using their neighborhood in lawful ways. 288 In

283. See supra notes 261-63 and accompanying text (comparing neighborhood exclusion orders
to abuse prevention restraining orders).
284. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (summarizing the broken windows theory).
285. The direct mechanism of Wilson and Kelling's theory posits that a broken window, if left
unrepaired, signals to lawbreakers that "no one cares" and leads to the rest of the windows being
broken. See supra note 25.
286. As an indirect cause of serious crime, low-level disorder can create fear among community
residents, who will begin to stay indoors, withdraw from their community, and eventually stop
trying to assert control over the neighborhood. See supra note 24.
287. In this respect, crime can follow epidemiological patterns observed for public health risks. In
his influential article, The Tipping Point, Malcolm Gladwell theorized that crime, like a low-level
flu outbreak, can develop non-linearly. Applied to crime, the tipping point theory suggests that
crime might develop linearly until a small incremental increase brings it to a critical point leading to
a severe escalation in crime rates. MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS
CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE (2000); Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point, THE NEW YORKER,

June 3, 1996, at 32; see also Greene, supra note 28, at 181 (discussing the tipping point
phenomenon); George L. Kelling, Why Did People Stop Committing Crimes? An Essay About
Criminology and Ideology, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 567, 578 (2000) (maintaining that crime
decreased in New York City because it declined to a tipping point at which crime plummeted).
288. See Wm. Garth Snider, Banishment. The History of Its Use and a Proposalfor Its Abolition

Under the First Amendment, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 455, 482-83 (1998)
(noting about traditional banishment that "[a] community that believes that it has fewer criminals in
its midst is less likely to be distrustful of itself," and that community confidence might in turn
enhance community quality of life).
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contrast, it would be difficult to justify neighborhood exclusion as a
remedy to an entire community in a low crime area where occasional
289
drug activity occurs below the public's threshold of perception.
4.

Not HistoricallyRegarded as CriminalPunishment

For many of the same reasons that neighborhood exclusion serves a
civil purpose, neighborhood exclusion does not resemble traditional
criminal punishment. Opponents of neighborhood exclusion have
argued, and at least one court has agreed, that neighborhood exclusion
amounts to banishment, a traditional criminal punishment.290 Traditional
banishment was intended to incapacitate the banished individual and
protect citizens within the banishing jurisdiction. 291 Traditional
banishment is undoubtedly a criminal punishment, one that generally is
considered unlawful, even as a criminal sentence.29 2 Banishment has
been criticized for its failure to rehabilitate the offender,293 for permitting
289. Debra Livingston has also observed that isolated occurrences of disorder are not themselves
destructive of a community. For example, she notes that a single person loitering on a comer does
not threaten the neighborhood's quality of life, but the loitering of many on a single street is likely
to trigger decline. See Livingston, supra note 6, at 559; see also Wilson & Kelling, supra note 22, at
35 ("Arresting a single drunk or a single vagrant who has harmed no identifiable person seems
unjust, and in a sense it is. But failing to do anything about a score of drunks or a hundred vagrants
may destroy an entire community.").
290. See Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 119 F. Supp. 2d 735, 748-49 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (finding a
double jeopardy violation where individual was both convicted of a criminal offense and excluded
from a drug free zone for the same underlying conduct), aff'd on other grounds, 310 F.3d 484 (6th
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2276 (2003).
291. See Snider, supra note 288, at 481 (noting that banishment was most likely intended to
further the goals of incapacitation and community protection).
292. See generally Leipold, supra note 216, at 490-91 (noting that many states have abolished
the practice of banishment); Snider, supra note 288, at 484-99 (discussing bases for disallowing
banishment); Jason S. Alloy, Note, "158-County Banishment" in Georgia. Constitutional
Implications Under the State Constitution and the Federal Right To Travel, 36 GA. L. REV. 1083,
1087 (2002) (noting that courts have held banishment to be illegal because it does not rehabilitate
the banished, because it permits the banishing jurisdiction to unload its undesirables upon other
jurisdictions, and because it has been held to violate various state constitutions). At least fifteen
states have provisions in their constitutions that expressly prohibit the banishment of individuals
from the state. Snider, supra note 288, at 465 & n.70 (citing state constitutional provisions
prohibiting banishment). Even in the absence of an express prohibition against banishment from a
state, other state courts have held that sentences of banishment are unlawful on public policy
grounds. Id. at 465-66 & n.78 (citing cases finding banishment conditions unlawful and opining that
the absence of express constitutional prohibitions against banishment in the applicable state
constitutions may explain the courts' use of public policy grounds to strike down the banishment
conditions).
293. Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880,
1895 n.75 (1991) (noting that permanent exile appears reserved for those beyond rehabilitation and
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jurisdictions to dump their criminals on neighboring jurisdictions, 9 for
depriving the banished individual of any community, 29' and
punishment unauthorized by the legislature.29 6
Any resemblance between contemporary neighborhood exclusion and
traditional banishment is superficial at best. This point is best made by
comparing both sanctions to prison, the quintessential criminal
that the only possible rehabilitative justification for such banishment would be if the offender were
so disappointed in his banishment from his original community that he would behave in the future
so that he would not also lose the community to which he was moved); Snider, supra note 288, at
478 ("It is highly unlikely that banishment has either as its intended effect, or actually effectuates,
any sort of rehabilitation."); see also State v. Franklin, 604 N.W.2d 79, 83 (Minn. 2000) (excluding
defendant from entire city was not reasonably related to goal of rehabilitating him); McCreary v.
State, 582 So. 2d 425, 428 (Miss. 1991) (observing that banishment from a large geographical area
does not serve a rehabilitative function); Johnson v. State, 672 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984) (noting that banishing defendant from county would not assist in rehabilitating him); Ray v.
McCoy, 321 S.E.2d 90, 93 (W. Va. 1984) (noting that banished persons are not likely to be
rehabilitated because they lack supervision while banished).
294. Rutherford v. Blankenship, 468 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (W.D. Va. 1979) (holding that
banishment offends public policy by allowing one state to dump criminals into another state);
People v. Baum, 231 N.W. 95, 96 (Mich. 1930) (same); State v. Charlton, 846 P.2d 341, 343 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1992) (same); People v. Green, 451 N.Y.S.2d 970, 972 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (same); State
v. Doughtie, 74 S.E.2d 922, 924 (N.C. 1953) (same).
295. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that deprivation of citizenship constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, in part because it "strips the citizen of
his status in the national and international political community." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958). It is perhaps due to similar concerns about the loss of community that courts have generally
struck down any sentence that banishes an offender from an entire or most of a state, while
upholding sentences of "banishment" that apply to only a small geographic area. See Snider, supra
note 288, at 473 (noting that appellate courts have upheld probation conditions that restrict the
probationer's ability to enter a geographic area "if the banishment is confined to a small geographic
area"); see also United States v. Cothran, 855 F.2d 749, 752 (11 th Cir. 1988) (upholding probation
condition prohibiting defendant from entering the county without the permission of his probation
officer); Dukes v. State, 423 So. 2d 329, 331 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) (upholding probation
condition prohibiting probationer from entering the store from which she stole); State v. Morgan,
389 So. 2d 364, 366 (La. 1980) (upholding probation condition that required defendant, convicted
of attempted prostitution, to stay out of New Orleans's notorious French Quarter); State v.
Harrington, 336 S.E.2d 852, 857 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding probation condition restricting
drunken driver's ability to enter establishments selling alcoholic beverages).
296. Some courts have refused to impose banishment because the power to impose banishment
belongs to the legislature and is not inherent in the judiciary. See, e.g., Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4
Dall.) 14, 19 (1800) (holding that "the power of confiscation and banishment does not belong to the
judicial authority ... and yet, it is a power, that grows out of the very nature of the social compact,
which must reside somewhere, and which is so inherent in the legislature"); Rutherford, 468 F.
Supp. at 1360 (stating that "the power to banish, if it exists at all, is a power vested in the
Legislature"); Weigand v. Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 780, 781 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965) (holding that
it is not within court's authority to impose banishment in lieu of prison sentence); People v.
Wallace, 124 N.Y.S.2d 201, 204 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1953) (holding that banishment cannot be imposed
by judiciary). Neighborhood exclusions, on the other hand, result from legislative action.
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punishment. Even traditional banishment is distinguishable from prison
in that it does not literally incapacitate; it simply prohibits the individual
from offending within the banishing jurisdiction. However, traditional
banishment does serve the same function as prison if viewed solely from
the self-interested perspective of the banishing jurisdiction. As long as
the banished individual offends outside the geographic boundaries of the
banishing jurisdiction, the citizens within the banishing jurisdiction are
as protected from him as if the individual were in prison.
In contrast, neighborhood exclusion does not attempt to segregate the
offender from the entire constituency of the banishing political entity.
Rather, it simply seeks to move the offender within the jurisdiction from
one geographic subsection into others. Although the offender may be
incapacitated with respect to a discrete geographic neighborhood, the
offender still remains a part of the citizenry of the larger governmental
veith
entity that issues the neighborhood exclusion. 297 Moreover,
if the
offender does reoffend during the exclusion term, it is the jurisdiction
that issued the exclusion order that bears the burden of the offense, not
some other jurisdiction whose citizens were not represented in the
decision to order the exclusion.298
Neighborhood exclusion is also distinguishable from traditional
banishment because it does not deprive the excluded individual of her
community. As one commentator wrote recently about traditional
banishment,
In its most general and benign form, banishment is the
punishment of one who has incurred the displeasure of a group
to which one had previously enjoyed full membership status. As
a means of expressing displeasure with the conduct of the
banished, the community takes the ultimate step and declares
that the banished individual is no longer a part of the
community.... [T]he banished individual presumably retains no
rights of membership in the community from which he/she was
banished.2 99

297. For the same reason that neighborhood exclusion orders do not further incapacitation, a
traditional goal of criminal punishment, the orders do not deprive offenders of the political process.
Although excluded from a geographic subsection of the city, excluded individuals retain their
membership within recognized political entities. But see Snider, supra note 288, at 495 (arguing that
traditional banishment deprives individuals of their ability to participate in the political process).
298. See supra notes 276-82 and accompanying text for the potential of neighborhood exclusion
ordinances to displace crime from a high-crime neighborhood into surrounding areas.
299. Snider, supra note 288, at 476.
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When a neighborhood exclusion order is issued, the geographic area
from which the affected individual is excluded is not necessarily that
individual's own neighborhood. If the intention of the ordinance were to
punish the excluded individual by depriving him of his community, then
the scope of the exclusion would be determined by the individual's place
of residence. In contrast, neighborhood exclusion orders attempt to
displace crime from high-crime areas primarily by closing the
neighborhood off to community outsiders who enter the area and
commit crimes there. For example, a wealthy suburbanite who leaves her
own community to purchase drugs in a high-crime area cannot claim that
an exclusion from the high-crime area deprives her of her community.
When the affected individual does happen to reside within the zone, she
can apply for a variance permitting her to move between essential
locations within the zone during the period of the exclusion.3 °°
Finally, neighborhood exclusion orders are far less burdensome than
traditional banishment. Traditional banishment was permanent and
required the individual to leave the country, 30 an entire state, or a large
part of a state.30 2 Neighborhood exclusion orders, on the other hand, are
of a limited
duration 30 3 and apply to only discrete neighborhoods within
4
a city.

30

3 °5 the federal district court held that
In Johnson v. City of Cincinnati,
neighborhood exclusion was criminal punishment, likening it to
banishment.30 6 However, the court's analysis was inconsistent with
Hudson. For example, the court reasoned that neighborhood exclusion
was just as punitive as banishment because it prevented excluded
individuals from seeking employment within designated zones during
the time of exclusion. 30 7 However, in Hudson, the Court held that an

300. See State v. James, 978 P.2d 415, 419 (Or. Ct. App. 1999); see also Leipold, supranote 216,
at 491 (arguing that targeted loitering laws do not equate to banishment).
301. See James, 978 P.2d at 419.
302. See Snider, supra note 288, at 466.
303. See James, 978 P.2d at 419.
304. See id.
305. 119 F. Supp. 2d 735 (S.D. Ohio 2000), aff'don other grounds, 310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2276 (2003).
306. Id. at 748. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court, but on the grounds that the ordinance
violated the plaintiffs' rights to intrastate travel and to association. See Johnson v. City of
Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 506 n.10 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that the court need not decide whether
neighborhood exclusion constitutes criminal punishment in light of the case's disposition of
plaintiffs' other issues), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2276 (2003).
307. Johnson, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 748.
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individual's lifetime disbarment from his chosen profession did not
amount to criminal punishment. Even courts adopting a seemingly
expansive concept of criminal punishment have distinguished between
impairment of employment-which is not criminal punishment under
Hudson-and restrictions that render an individual entirely
unemployable. 30 8 A temporary exclusion from small geographic areas of
a city does not significantly impair employment activities, let alone
render the individual unemployable.
5.

Not Excessive in Relation to Civil Purposes

Finally, the exclusion orders are not excessive in light of the marketdisrupting purpose of neighborhood exclusion ordinances. 30 9 The nature
of the exclusions demonstrates that they are intended not to punish the
excluded individuals by depriving them of access to the zone, but simply
to disrupt their ability to participate in the retail market within the zone.
The exclusions are short-term, and even during the period of exclusion,
individuals may receive variances to enter the zones for legitimate
purposes.
In sum, a short-term neighborhood exclusion order does not appear to
constitute criminal punishment under current jurisprudence, at least not
when applied in high-crime neighborhoods where exclusion serves nonpunitive purposes. 3 10 Accordingly, neighborhood exclusion ordinances
should not be subject to the constitutional jurisprudence governing
criminal law and procedure.
C.

RecharacterizingMorales

Although the ordinances are concerned with qualitatively different
harms, neighborhood exclusion ordinances and the Chicago anti-gang
308. See Doe I v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'dsub nom. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S.
84, 123 S. Ct. 1140, reh'g denied, 123 S. Ct. 1925 (2003). In Doe !, the Ninth Circuit struck down
Alaska's sex offender registration program, holding that it constituted criminal punishment, in part
because the registrants' offender status was easily discoverable by the public and therefore likely to
prevent registrants from obtaining employment of any kind. In doing so, the court distinguished this
aspect of the program at issue in Doe I from the disbarment from a single profession found to be
civil in Hudson. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision, in
part because sex offenders remained free to change employment. Smith, 123 S. Ct. at 1151.
309. See James, 978 P.2d at 420-21.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 283-89 for a discussion of the reasons why
neighborhood exclusions should be limited to high-crime areas in order to be considered nonpunitive.
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loitering ordinance at issue in Morales share some fundamental
similarities. Both ordinances seek to protect neighborhoods by
authorizing police to constrain the movement of individuals seen as
disruptive to those neighborhoods. 1 ' Chicago's ordinance authorized the
movement of suspected gang members and those loitering with them,
while Portland's ordinance authorizes the exclusion of suspected drug
offenders.3 12 Moreover, under both ordinances, police orders did not
result in arrest and prosecution unless the targeted individual disobeyed
the orders by 3failing to move along or by re-entering a drug free zone,
3
respectively. 1
Part III.B notes the strong argument that neighborhood exclusion
should be treated as a civil restraint. Additionally, at least some of the
few lower courts that have addressed that issue have held that
3 14
neighborhood exclusion does not constitute criminal punishment.
From that perspective, the exclusion order is a civil restraint that should
be evaluated as such, and the rules governing criminal laws do not come
into play until the excluded individual is arrested for criminal trespass
for violating the terms of the exclusion order. Applying that model to
Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance, a police order to disperse from
the site of gang-loitering should be evaluated as a civil restraint, while
an arrest or prosecution for failing to obey that order should be analyzed
under the rules governing the criminal justice system.
Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court was quick to analyze the
entirety of Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance as a criminal
statute.31 5 For example, in concluding that it was "clear" that the
plaintiffs could bring a facial challenge to the ordinance, the Court stated
simply that the ordinance was "a criminal law. 316 The Court provided
little analysis to support this conclusion. The city argued that only the
"arrest" component of the statute should be scrutinized for vagueness,
311. See text accompanying supra notes 50-53 and 207-16 for a summary of Chicago's antigang loitering ordinance and Portland's drug free zone ordinance, respectively.
312. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41,47 (1999) (summarizing CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL
CODE § 8-4-015 (2002) and PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE § 14B.20.030(A)).
313. See id. (summarizing CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 8-4-015 (2002) and PORTLAND, OR.,
CITY CODE § 14B.20.030(A)).

314. State v. Lhasawa, 55 P.3d 477, 488 (Or. 2002); James, 978 P.2d at 417-21.
315. See Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering, the Court, and Some Realism About Police Patrol,
1999 SUP. CT. REV. 141, 184-85 (criticizing the Court's failure in Morales to credit Chicago's
ordinance for requiring a "move along" order prior to arrest).
316. Morales, 527 U.S. at 55 (stating that the ordinance was "a criminal law that contains no
mens rea requirement," rendering a facial challenge permissible).
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and the arrest portion of the ordinance clearly set forth that it was a
crime to disobey a dispersal order issued under the ordinance.31 7 The
majority rejected the city's argument because the ordinance gave
insufficient guidance to police officers deciding whether to issue the
dispersal orders in the first place. 3' 8 However, the Court failed to explain
why it was demanding more particularity to govern the issuance of
dispersal orders 31than
would be required generally in any other non9
criminal context.
A plurality of Justices at least attempted to articulate a governing
principle for determining whether an ordinance should be scrutinized for
vagueness, stating that it was the loitering component of the statute that
should be scrutinized for vagueness, not just the refusal to obey a
dispersal order, because "the loitering is the conduct that the ordinance is
designed to prohibit." 320 But, as the dissenting Justices correctly noted,
what should matter for purposes of vagueness review "is not what the
ordinance is 'designed to prohibit,' but what it actually subjects to
criminal penalty."3 2 1 The ultimate objective of a statute cannot be what
determines whether it is treated as a criminal law; otherwise, in the
special needs context, administrative search provisions aimed at chop
shops would be treated as criminal, and drug-testing programs designed
322
to encourage substance abuse treatment would be treated as civil.

317. Id. at 58.
318. See id. at 62 (noting that the ordinance's authorization for police offers to arrest only after a
dispersal order has been disobeyed "does not provide any guidance to the officer deciding whether
such an order should issue").
319. The U.S. Supreme Court is more tolerant of imprecision in civil ordinances than those that
impose criminal penalties "because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe."
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982). Similarly,
because of the qualitative differences between criminal and civil punishment, the rule of lenity
applies only to criminal statutes. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (noting that
ambiguous criminal statutes should be construed narrowly "because of the seriousness of criminal
penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the
community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity") (citations omitted).
320. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 58 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter and Ginsburg, JJ.).
321. Id. at 90 (Scalia, J., dissenting),
322. Compare New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 717 (1987) (holding that searches of auto parts
businesses were "administrative" in nature, even though conducted by police officers for the
purpose of reducing car thefts), with Ferguson v, City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83-84 (2000)
(holding that searches of pregnant women for evidence of drugs was a traditional criminal search
despite ultimate objective of forgoing criminal prosecution if the women entered drug treatment).
See supra notes 255-59 and 268-75 and accompanying text for further discussion of Burger and
Ferguson.
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One could argue that the Court treated Chicago's dispersal orders as
criminal in nature because Chicago placed both the authority to issue the
orders and the prohibition for violating the orders in the same criminal
ordinance. The question of whether a law is criminal turns on legislative
intent, 323 and th
the C
Chicago City Council included dispersal orders in the
same ordinance as a criminal penalty. However, it does not appear that
the Court envisioned the ordinance's constitutional flaw as a mere
labeling problem. As an initial matter, because the Court wholly omitted
any analysis of whether the ordinance was civil or criminal, it certainly
did not state that it was relying on the inclusion of the authority for the
dispersal orders in the same law as a criminal penalty. Moreover, the
Court suggested ways in which Chicago might cure the ordinance's
flaws,324 but never suggested it would be so simple as enacting two
separate ordinances: a civil provision authorizing police to order
loiterers to disperse and a criminal ordinance prohibiting the failure to
heed a dispersal order.
The problem in Morales, then, appears to have been the lawfulness
of the underlying dispersal orders. Although the Court relied on the void
for vagueness doctrine to find the dispersal orders unlawful, it did so
without articulating a convincing basis for treating dispersal orders as
criminal sanctions.325 Alternatively, the Court could have treated the
dispersal orders in Morales as civil sanctions, unlike the criminal law
that prohibited disobeying the dispersal orders. Had the Court done so,
the constitutionality of the dispersal orders could still have been
questioned, but the void for vagueness doctrine would not be seen as a
323. See supra notes 221-26 for a summary of the two-prong test of statutory construction that
governs whether a law imposes criminal punishment. The first step in the analysis requires the court
to ask whether the legislature indicated a preference for either the civil or criminal label in
establishing the penalty. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997).
324. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 62 (noting that the ordinance would be lawful if it "only applied to
loitering that had an apparently harmful purpose or effect, or possibly if it only applied to loitering
by persons reasonably believed to be criminal gang members").
325. It is unclear whether the new discretion scholars view dispersal orders as civil or criminal in
nature. For example, Debra Livingston argues that some effective public safety efforts could be
made by using civil sanctions and injunctions, but then appears to assume that a law requiring police
to ask citizens to cease their behavior before issuing a citation is criminal in nature. Livingston,
supra note 6, at 637 (noting that discretion to enforce criminal prohibitions could be limited by
"requiring that people be requested to cease specified behavior before citation or arrest is
authorized"). On the other hand, Livingston maintains that cities could treat loitering as "a civil
infraction for which arrest and prosecution are permissible only when a loiterer refuses to comply
with a police request to move along or fails to respond to a citation for civil infraction." Id. at 639
(noting the potential to treat school loitering and loitering with intent to engage in prostitution or in
drug distribution in this manner).
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threat to new policing approaches, at least those that depart from
criminal punishment. In other words, legislatures would be permitted to
entrust police with discretion as long as that discretion did not include
decisions about whom to arrest on criminal charges.
By relying improperly on the void for vagueness doctrine, the Court
permitted itself to avoid deciding the difficult issues that would have
been presented if the Court had evaluated Chicago's anti-gang loitering
ordinance as a civil sanction. For example, unlike the neighborhood
exclusion orders issued under drug free zone ordinances, the orders to
disperse authorized by Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance were
delivered orally and informally and could not be challenged.326 Under a
due process inquiry, the Court would have had to balance the nature of
the private interest involved, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such an
interest given the nature of the procedure used, and the nature of the
governmental interest involved.32 7
Moreover, the Court would have had to determine whether laws
affecting an individual's freedom of movement in public places
implicate a protected constitutional right to travel or, more apt in
Morales, a right not to travel (i.e., to loiter). Laws that implicate
fundamental rights are subject to strict judicial scrutiny.32 8 Moreover,
326. Cf PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE § 14B.20.010-.060 (2002) (setting forth procedures for
appealing neighborhood exclusion order under Portland's drug free zone ordinance); see also State
v. Johnson, 988 P.2d 913, 915 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that Portland's drug free zone ordinance
procedures did not deprive the defendant of due process, even though the exclusion notice did not
explain that an appeal of the order would stay the order, because the notice explained the right to
appeal and process for appealing); State v. James, 978 P.2d 415, 421 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding
drug free zone ordinance against due process challenge because "[it is difficult to imagine a greater
procedural protection than a predeprivation hearing").
327. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Laurence Tribe has also noted the difficulty
of identifying the right protected by the Court in Morales. To Tribe, the Court's ruling could not
have been a matter of procedural due process, because procedural concerns would have been
implicated only if the individual was denied an adequate hearing on the factual issue of whether he
had disobeyed a dispersal order. Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the
Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the Future-OrReveal the Structure of the Present?, 113
HARV. L. REV. 110, 192 (1999). His analysis gives short shrift to the argument that the problem was
the absence of any adequate procedural protections concerning the factual issue of whether the
individual should have been the subject of a dispersal order for loitering.
328. Laws implicating a fundamental liberty are subject to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992) (finding unconstitutional a state statute that required
women to notify their husbands before having an abortion, except in limited circumstances); Moore
v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500 (1977) (invalidating zoning ordinance limiting
occupancy to members of a single "family," defined narrowly); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485-86 (1965) (striking down a state statute that made it illegal to use or counsel others to use
contraceptives); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (declaring state statute authorizing
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courts are less tolerant of vagueness in laws-civil or criminal-that
might restrain constitutionally protected activities.329 Accordingly, if the
Court had found a fundamental right to loiter in Morales, it could have

struck down the law without suggesting that a dispersal order constitutes
a criminal sanction.
Lower courts are divided over the issue of whether the constitutional
right to travel protects a freedom of movement intrastate. 330 To date, the
U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the right to travel has
been limited to cases involving interstate travel.3 31 The Court has never
recognized a right to travel within a state,332 and the nature of the

interstate right to travel suggests that the right might not be implicated
by restrictions on intrastate travel.333

Although the Court bypassed the opportunity to make a clear
pronouncement in Morales regarding the existence of a fundamental
right not to travel, the myriad of opinions in that case suggests that a
majority of the Court would permit cities to restrict individuals' freedom

sterilization of "habitual" criminals to be unconstitutional).
329. See Viii. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982)
(noting that "perhaps the most important factor affecting the clarity that the Constitution demands of
a law is whether it threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights").
330. Compare Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 495-98 (6th Cir. 2002) (recognizing a
constitutional right to "travel locally through public spaces and roadways"), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct.
2276 (2003), Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing a
"fundamental right of free movement"), and Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 268 (3d Cir. 1990)
(recognizing substantive due process right to "move freely about one's neighborhood or town"),
with Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (expressing doubt that
substantive due process extends to a general right of free movement), Wright v. City of Jackson,
506 F.2d 900, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1975) (rejecting a fundamental right to intrastate travel), and
Eldridge v. Bouchard, 645 F. Supp. 749, 753-54 (W.D. Va. 1986) (refusing to recognize a
fundamental right to intrastate travel), aff'd without opinion, 823 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1987).
331. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31
(1969).
332. The Court has previously declined to consider whether to distinguish between interstate and
intrastate travel. Mem. Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974).
333. The right to travel freely between states arises from the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2 of the United States Constitution and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500-04. Article IV's Privileges and Immunities
Clause restrains state efforts to deny out-of-staters access to local resources. See, e.g., Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 59 n.5 (1982) (holding that the Privileges and Immunities Clause "'was
designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the
citizens of State B enjoy"') (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948)). The Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only those rights of citizenship that owe
their existence to the federal government, its character, or its laws, not unenumerated rights. See The
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872).
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of intrastate movement. Although six Justices voted in Morales to strike
334
down Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance on vagueness grounds,
the defendants in Morales failed to gain the support of a majority of the
Court for their argument that the Chicago ordinance violated a
constitutional right to loiter. Only three members of the Court were
prepared to recognize a fundamental "freedom to loiter for innocent
purposes. 335 Three dissenting Justices made clear their rejection of such
a right.336
While the three concurring Justices did not expressly address the issue
of a right to loiter, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, in which
Justice Breyer joined, suggests at least two additional votes against a
fundamental right to loiter.337 While O'Connor and Breyer purported to
"express no opinion about" issues other than the ordinance's vagueness,
they made a point of noting that "there remain open to Chicago
reasonable alternatives to combat the very real threat posed by gang
intimidation and violence. 338 Specifically, the Justices indicated that an
anti-loitering ordinance would pass muster if it targeted only gang
members or applied only in specific geographic areas.339 If such
ordinances would be lawful, then either there is no fundamental right to
loiter, or this supposed right to "loiter for innocent purposes" is an
entirely different kind of fundamental right than those that trigger the
strictest judicial scrutiny under substantive due process3 40 or equal
protection 34 1 jurisprudence. Indeed, even the Justices who supposedly

334. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60-64 (1999) (six-member opinion of the Court,
holding that anti-gang loitering ordinance entrusted too much discretion to police officers to
determine which types of loitering "purposes" were lawful).
335. Id. at 53 (Stevens, J., with Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joining).
336. See id. at 102-06 (Thomas, J., dissenting, with Rehnquist and Scalia, JJ., joining).
337. See id at 64-69 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, with Breyer, J., joining).
338. Id. at 67.
339. Id.
340. To pass strict scrutiny, a law must be necessary to the accomplishment of a compelling
government interest. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984); see Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) (invalidating zoning ordinance limiting occupancy to
members of a single "family," defined narrowly); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86
(1965) (invalidating state law prohibiting contraception); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942) (subjecting state law mandating sterilization of some felons to strict scrutiny under due
process analysis).
341. See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (striking down poll tax as
a violation of equal protection, in part because it implicated the "political franchise of voting");
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19-20 (1956) (holding that state law requiring appellants to provide
a trial transcript at their own expense violated rights to equal protection by denying indigent
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recognized a constitutional right to loiter did not appear to give this right
the same weight as those previously recognized as fundamental,
suggesting that the right could342be limited by narrower-but nevertheless
quite restrictive--ordinances.
The goal of this Article is not to answer the ultimate question of
whether Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance would pass
constitutional muster if analyzed as a civil statute. Rather, the Article
recasts the dispersal orders authorized by the ordinance as civil restraints
for the purpose of demonstrating that the Court could have preserved a
judicial role in scrutinizing the dispersal orders without insisting
inappropriately on a level of legislative clarity typically reserved for
criminal statutes and laws that implicate fundamental constitutional
rights.
D.

Applying the ProgrammaticPurposeApproach

The political process theory offered by Kahan and Meares and my
recommended programmatic purpose approach sometimes will lead to
the same result, albeit for different reasons. For example, Kahan and
343
Meares attribute the government's ability to erect sobriety checkpoints
and to search individuals at airports 344 and in government buildings 345 to
the fact that these searches burden average members of the
community.346 However, the evenhanded application of the searches is

defendants access to state courts).
342. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 62 (noting that the ordinance would be lawful if it applied only to

loitering with an apparently harmful purpose or effect, "or possibly if it only applied to loitering by
persons reasonably believed to be criminal gang members").
343. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (upholding brief, suspicionless
seizures of motorists at sobriety checkpoints aimed at removing drunk drivers from the road); see
also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979) (suggesting that roadblocks could be used to

verify drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations).
344. United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 498 (2d Cir. 1974) (upholding airport security

checkpoints as reasonable by balancing individual liberty interests against government's interest in
preventing hijacking); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908-12 (9th Cir. 1973) (analyzing
search at airport screening checkpoint as an administrative search); United States v. Moreno, 475
F.2d 44, 48-49 (5th Cir. 1973) (noting that most airport searches are justified by the exigent
circumstances presented by the need for on-flight safety).
345. See United States v. Bulacan, 156 F.3d 963, 967-73 (9th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that
searches of people entering government buildings can be justified if limited in scope to fulfill the
government's legitimate need to discover weapons and explosives); Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d

1230, 1232-33 (6th Cir. 1972) (upholding search at government building as reasonable in light of
government's interest in protecting federal employees and property).
346. See Kahan & Meares, supra note 39, at 1172-73; see also Meares & Kahan, supra note 115,
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just one factor in determining its programmatic purpose. Another critical
factor in all of these examples is the close connection between the
government action and an interest other than traditional criminal
investigation. For example, searches occur at the entrances of
government buildings and airport terminals to ensure that no one enters
with weapons or explosives, not for the primary purpose of discovering
evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution.3 47 Similarly, stopping
motorists on roadways is a way to ensure that drivers are sober and
licensed.348 In contrast, a roadblock erected simply to determine whether
any cars contain evidence of a crime does not serve any government
objective other than traditional criminal investigation. 349 Therefore,
under the programmatic purpose theory, the roadblock would be subject
to normal Fourth Amendment requirements. 350 Under Kahan and
Meares's political process approach, such a roadblock would
presumably be permissible as long as it burdens average members of the
community.
Similarly, consider Kahan and Meares's approval of the Chicago
Housing Authority's (CHA) building search policy. 351 Under the policy,
CHA police were permitted to authorize warrantless sweeps of the
homes of residents of Housing Authority developments under certain
352
circumstances, including to locate weapons after shooting incidents.
at 255 (explaining that roadblocks and searches at airports and government buildings are best
explained under their political process theory because "insofar as these policies do burden average
members of the community, there is much less reason for courts to doubt the determination of
politically accountable officials that these policies strike a fair balance between liberty and order").
347. See Bulacan, 156 F.3d at 967-73 (holding search for drugs at the entrance of a federal
building to be outside the lawful scope of an administrative search justified by the government's
interest in locating weapons and explosives and not by a general interest in finding evidence of
criminal activity).
348. See supranote 343.
349. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (holding that a roadblock erected to
facilitate drug interdiction did not advance a special need and was "primarily for the ordinary
enterprise of investigating crimes").
350. This is the current approach under the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence. Id.
351. See Pratt v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 155 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. Il1. 1994) (lawsuit challenging
constitutionality of Chicago Housing Authority's search policy).
352. Under the policy, Chicago Housing Authority police were permitted to conduct warrantless
searches of the homes of residents of Housing Authority developments under certain circumstances.
Id. at 178. The requisite preconditions included "random gunfire from building to building and/or
intimidation at gunpoint or by shooting if weapons were taken into buildings." Id. If the police
could not determine into which apartment the weapons were taken, the policy authorized extensive
"sweeps" of all residential apartment units in the building, which included looking in closets and
drawers and searching residents' personal effects. Id.
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Applying their political process approach, Kahan and Meares argue that
the CHA building search policy should be upheld because the burden of
unannounced searches fell on everyone in the projects, not just on
persons suspected of wrongdoing, and because their representatives had
approved the policy.3 53 Under the programmatic purpose approach, in
contrast, the central inquiry is whether the policy advances a purpose
other than ferreting out evidence of criminal activity to be used in
criminal proceedings. For example, if the government used evidence
discovered during the searches against tenants in criminal prosecutions,
but did nothing with respect to their tenancy, the searches would appear
to promote traditional criminal investigation and prosecution. If, on the
other hand, evidence from the searches was used to support eviction
from public housing, the searches would appear designed to ensure that
housing units were given to tenants who were not engaged in criminal
activity on the property.354 The fact that the CHA searches were
triggered by individual occurrences of crime suggests a primary motive
to gather evidence to support an arrest and prosecution, not a "special
need" to maintain the safety of the developments on an ongoing basis.
Unlike the political process theory, the programmatic purpose
approach would permit cities to implement strategies requiring police
discretion, as long as those strategies avoided traditional criminal
investigation, prosecution, and punishment. The discussion of Portland's
353. See Kahan & Meares, supra note 39, at 1175. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying
text for further discussion of Kahan and Meares's analysis of the CHA building search policy.
354. The heart of the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable
cause requirements is the government's need to conduct searches for purposes other than simply
discovering evidence of a crime. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002)
(upholding as reasonable drug testing of students to ensure that drug-affected students were not
involved in extracurricular activities); Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995)
(upholding suspicionless drug tests of student athletes partly because the results of the tests were not
turned over to law enforcement authorities); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 666 (1989) (upholding suspicionless drug testing of certain sensitive Customs Agents
partly because it was "clear that the ... program [was] not designed to serve the ordinary needs of
law enforcement"); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 621 n.5 (1989)
(upholding a suspicionless drug testing scheme aimed at railroad employees because it was not
designed as a pretext to gather evidence for law enforcement purposes); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480
U.S. 709, 721-21 (1987) (suggesting that Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement should not
apply when the government searches its employees' workspace for evidence of work-related
misconduct); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 n.7 (1985) (upholding a warrantless search
on school grounds when justified by "special needs" and not conducted for the advancement of law
enforcement). The strongest argument to support searches in public housing projects is that the
searches are necessary to ensure that the government allocates scarce subsidized housing to those
who do not use it for criminal purposes. Cf Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125,
135 (2002) (upholding policy permitting evictions from public housing for criminal activity).
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drug free zones in Part III.B demonstrates one way a civil regime can
enable government to exercise control over public spaces.35 5 Current
restrictions on access to public housing properties present similar civil
consequences.3 56 While the programmatic purpose approach would
permit many such civil sanctions, it would not permit vague criminal
laws. This approach has several advantages. First, it preserves the
important value of notice to the citizenry regarding the scope of criminal
prohibitions. 357 It recognizes that, even for low-level criminal offenses, a
criminal sanction is qualitatively different from civil penalties because it
reflects society's moral condemnation.358 Accordingly, criminal
punishment should not be imposed unless the defendant had at least a
fair opportunity to know that his conduct was criminal.
Second, the programmatic purpose approach will give municipalities
an incentive to avoid using criminal laws to regulate disorder. If forced
to resort to non-criminal laws to permit discretionary responses to
disorder, cities might develop more effective, flexible approaches rather
than outright prohibitions. 359 Moreover, civil responses to disorder
permit cities to address the concerns of communities without imposing

355. This approach is not unique to American cities. For example, in the United Kingdom, the
Football Spectators Act authorizes "banning orders" that prohibit individuals who engage in banned
activities at football matches from attending future games. See Football (Disorder) Act, 2000, c. 25
(Eng.).
356. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, __ U.S. _,
123 S. Ct. 2191, 2198-99 (2003) (holding that
housing authority's trespass policy was not facially invalid under the First Amendment's
overbreadth doctrine); Rucker, 535 U.S. at 135 (upholding public housing policy authorizing
evictions for drug activity). But see Nora V. Demleitner, "CollateralDamage ": No Re-Entry for
Drug Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1027, 1049-53 (2002) (calling for the abolition of many civil
collateral consequences to criminal activity).
357. See supra Part II.D for a discussion of the importance of forcing legislatures to define
clearly the scope of criminal laws.
358. See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99
(1982) (noting that vagueness is more permissible in civil ordinances than in criminal laws "because
the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe"); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336,
348 (1971) (discussing the rule of lenity and noting that "because of the seriousness of criminal
penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the
community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity") (citations omitted).
359. See Livingston, supra note 6, at 638 ("Civil sanctions, moreover, are generally preferable to
penal sanctions when the community wishes to reduce the level of an activity-to regulate it-but
not prohibit the activity entirely."); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., ParadigmsLost: The Blurring of
the Criminal and Civil Law Models-And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 188792 (1992) (encouraging use of civil sanctions to respond to conduct that is not egregious). For
example, under Ellickson's zoning model, disfavored activities are not criminalized, but are treated
as "nonconforming uses" if committed within orderly zones of the city. See Ellickson, supra note
14, at 1232-39.
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the often ignored costs of enlarging the scope of criminal liability. After
all, the purported goal of new policing efforts is not to penalize violators
of norms, but to "negotiate compliance on the streets." 360 Civil responses
to disorder, for example, avoid stigmatizing the disorderly with arrest
and convictions for offenses that do not meet the traditional
requirements of criminal law. 36 1 Bernard Harcourt has set forth the
hidden costs of order-maintenance policing, including the reinforcement
of stereotypes about black criminality and increased tensions between at
least some African-American residents and the police due to the
proliferation of arrests for low-level offenses.362 The programmatic
purpose approach would also help ensure that new policing efforts were
not used as a pretext to engage in old-fashioned searches for evidence.363
The programmatic purpose approach also avoids the pitfalls of giving
malleable notions of community support and involvement constitutional
significance. 6 Under the programmatic purpose approach, political
majorities (or handfuls of citizens purporting to represent majorities) are
not permitted to waive the constitutional rights of the entire community.
Accordingly, there is no risk that rights will be lost because the relevant
community is defined improperly, because the community's level of
support was assessed inaccurately, or because the community supported
a police program only because it had no other realistic alternatives.
Most importantly, the programmatic purpose approach would require
courts to scrutinize new policing efforts on their individual merits.
Applying the void for vagueness doctrine to any police action that might
ultimately form the basis of a criminal arrest and prosecution, as the
Court appeared to do in Morales, casts too wide a net over prohibited
delegations of discretion. On the other hand, the new discretion scholars
are too quick to conclude that courts should permit police discretion,
even with respect to traditional criminal law efforts. The programmatic
purpose approach, in contrast, would require courts to engage in the fact-

360. Livingston, supra note 6, at 638.
361. Id. (noting that civil sanctions can be sufficient to handle community problems without
bearing "the hallmarks of blameworthiness associated with criminal law").
362. HARCOURT, supra note 29, at 166-79, 213.
363. See supra notes 118-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of how police could use
new policing models as a pretext to search for evidence of more serious crimes.
364. See supra Part II.A-B, E for discussions criticizing the new discretion scholars' reliance on
community sentiment.
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specific, "contextual" inquiry sought by new discretion scholars,36 5
without giving up the void for vagueness doctrine entirely.
A fact-specific inquiry would be required at two levels. First, courts
would need to decide whether a challenged police program served the
traditional functions of criminal law or whether it was qualitatively
different. For example, Part III.B of this Article argues that
neighborhood exclusion orders issued pursuant to drug free zone
ordinances do not constitute criminal punishment. However, the
classification of neighborhood exclusion as different from traditional
criminal procedure does not turn solely on majority support for the
exclusions, as it would under the political process model. Indeed,
classification of neighborhood exclusion as a civil restraint does not
even turn solely on the nature of the imposed burden. Rather, that
classification depends on the limited scope and duration of the restraint,
the availability of variances,
and, importantly, the extent of the existing
3 66
zones.
the
within
problem
If, after scrutinizing the parameters of a specific program and the
needs of the jurisdiction where it applies, a court determines that the
program amounts to traditional criminal law, then the court should
evaluate it as such by applying the rules that govern traditional criminal
law programs. For example, searches conducted as part of a traditional
criminal investigation should generally be conducted pursuant to a
warrant based on probable cause.367 Similarly, substantive criminal
prohibitions should be subject to the void for vagueness doctrine.
If, however, a court determines that the challenged program does not
promote the traditional aims of criminal law, the court should evaluate
the program as a civil restraint. In the civil context, the warrant and
probable cause requirements may not apply to searches, 368 and the void
for vagueness doctrine does not apply as rigidly to substantive
provisions.369 On the other hand, weighing the constitutionality of a noncriminal restraint requires the court to determine whether the civil
program implicated a fundamental right. 370 The court must then weigh
365. See Livingston, supra note 6, at 635.
366. See supra text accompanying notes 284-89 for a discussion of drug free zone ordinances
and the importance that they apply only to neighborhoods plagued by more than their proportional
share of criminal activity.
367. See supra note 270.
368. See supra notes 255-59, 268-74 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 319.
370. See supra notes 326-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of how improper judicial
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the government interest served by the restraint and the degree to which
the restraint serves that interest against the individual liberty interests at
stake.37 1 In this respect, judicial evaluation of the program as a noncriminal restraint provides a second opportunity to engage in a
contextualized review of the program. For example, in determining that
a Cincinnati neighborhood exclusion ordinance violated due process, the
Sixth Circuit refused to consider evidence demonstrating the ordinance's
effectiveness in Portland, suggesting that judicial inquiry should focus
on whether a particular program372sufficiently advances the government's
interest in a particularlocation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Early scholarship focusing on the new policing broke ground by
recognizing the importance of protecting not just the individual liberties
of offenders brought into the criminal justice system, but also the
interests of communities struggling to gain minimum controls over their
neighborhoods-controls that more privileged communities take for
granted. The new discretion scholars have argued that new policing
approaches should be subject to less stringent judicial scrutiny than
typical law enforcement efforts. To distinguish the new from the
traditional, they have relied on claimed inner-city support for new
policing approaches and on a political process theory in which inner-city
communities should be permitted to exchange
traditional liberty for
373
safety, as long as they do so evenhandedly.
However, in their attempt to empower inner-city neighborhoods to
establish necessary controls, the new discretion scholars have been too
quick to discard constitutional rules that preserve and respect critical
distinctions between criminal and non-criminal programs. This Article
reliance on the void for vagueness doctrine permits courts to avoid determining whether a law
implicates a fundamental right.
371. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
372. Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 504 (6th Cir. 2002) (suggesting that it may not
be appropriate to extrapolate "that what worked in Portland would likely work in [the targeted
Cincinnati zone]"), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2276 (2003). The Johnson court refused to consider
empirical evidence relating to the Portland ordinance also because the court subjected the ordinance
to strict scrutiny. Because the court recognized a fundamental right to intrastate movement, it was
concerned not only with the degree to which the ordinance advanced the government's interest, but
also whether the government could advance its purposes with less restrictive means. Id. As set forth
in supra notes 330-42 and accompanying text, there are reasons to believe that the U.S. Supreme
Court would not recognize a constitutional right to loiter.
373. See supra Part L.C for a discussion of the new discretion scholarship.
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has argued that the balance between traditional civil liberties and the
need for urban crime control would be better struck if cities were forced
to choose either nontraditional responses to public safety problems or to
be scrutinized under the traditional rules governing criminal law and
procedure. To separate "new" public safety responses from the
traditional, this Article encourages scrutiny of the challenged response's
programmatic purpose to determine whether it serves the traditional
purposes of criminal law.
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